• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00197 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10857 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00197 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10857 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00197 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10857 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00197 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10857 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00197 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10857 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00197 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10857 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00197 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10857 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00197 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10857 -0.18%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
05 December 2025

Information Sovereignty? Central Asia Tightens Control Over Its Information Space

Across the post-Soviet space, governments are adopting new measures that affect the scope of free expression. Similar trends are visible in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and parts of Eastern Europe, reflecting wider global shifts in how states manage their information environments. In Central Asia, where journalism has long faced political constraints, recent policies indicate a renewed emphasis on controlling the flow of information.

From Georgia to Kazakhstan: Pushback Against Foreign Narratives

Recent events in Georgia highlight these changes.

The adoption of a controversial “foreign agents” law, widely described as a Russian-style or “pro-Russian” measure, reflected the ruling party’s growing hostility to foreign-funded media and NGOs, many backed by European donors, and triggered mass pro-EU protests in Tbilisi. Similar dynamics are emerging in Central Asia, where officials increasingly view foreign narratives as interference in domestic affairs.

In Kazakhstan, legislative restrictions on so-called “LGBT propaganda” have sparked both domestic protests and criticism from international partners. At the same time, well-known media figure Gulnar Bazhkenova, editor-in-chief of Orda.kz, has been placed under house arrest, an episode that underscores the tightening environment for journalists.

The Bazhkenova Case: A Turning Point for Kazakh Media

Bazhkenova, a prominent editor known for critical coverage of Kazakhstan’s political elite and security services, came under scrutiny after Orda.kz falsely reported the arrest of Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu, an unverified claim that was quickly debunked. Although Nurtleu remained in his position immediately afterward, he was dismissed later in September, prompting speculation that the incident had political consequences.

Soon after his departure, law enforcement launched an investigation into Bazhkenova. On December 1, Almaty police searched her residence and the offices of Orda.kz. Authorities stated that a 2024 article had disseminated false information regarding a law enforcement officer allegedly caught accepting a bribe, an incident that officials assert never occurred. Another article reportedly misrepresented details in a property dispute, allegedly damaging the business reputation of the involved party.

The Almaty police have since opened additional investigations into past publications from Orda.kz that may contain misleading content.

Media organizations have largely responded with condemnation, urging the authorities to decriminalize the dissemination of false information and instead treat such cases under civil law. However, the Union of Journalists of Kazakhstan issued a pointed statement calling on media professionals to “treat the preparation and dissemination of information responsibly. Individual cases for the dissemination of inaccurate information cast a shadow on the entire journalistic community of our country,” the organization said.  An implicit acknowledgment, perhaps, that Bazhkenova’s actions may have crossed legal or ethical boundaries.

Parallel Cases and Regional Patterns

While suppression of the media in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan has long been widespread, Kyrgyzstan – long considered the most politically open country in Central Asia – has also moved to tighten control over its information space. In early 2024, authorities introduced a controversial “foreign representatives” law requiring NGOs and media outlets receiving international funding to register under a special status, echoing legislation seen in Russia and Georgia. Independent outlets such as Kloop, Temirov Live, and Azattyk (RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz service) have faced lawsuits, blocked websites, or forced suspension of activities under charges ranging from extremism to spreading false information. Journalists and media advocates warn that these measures, combined with new restrictions on “false” online content, represent a significant rollback of Kyrgyzstan’s traditionally pluralistic media environment and signal the government’s growing interest in asserting information sovereignty.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have also recently come under scrutiny for what some view as selective crackdowns tied to geopolitical alignments. This autumn, both countries detained bloggers seen as sympathetic to Russia’s geopolitical narrative. In Kazakhstan, blogger Aslan Tolegenov, known online as “Northern_Kazakh”, was convicted in November for inciting interethnic hatred, receiving a sentence of three years and nine months. Tolegenov was known for videos expressing pro-Russian views on the war in Ukraine and presenting himself as defending Russian speakers against what he called “Russophobia” in Kazakhstan.

In Uzbekistan, blogger Aziz Khakimov, known as “Comrade_Aziz,” was first fined in August for spreading false information about a university rector. A month later, prosecutors added charges including incitement of interethnic hatred, defamation, and war propaganda. The investigation was initiated after journalist Nikita Makarenko accused Khakimov of slander in a video. If convicted, Khakimov faces up to 10 years in prison.

A Region Redrawing Its Media Boundaries

Russian media outlets supportive of the so-called “Russian World” ideology have decried these arrests as betrayals by supposed allies. Yet, the broader trend suggests that regional governments are increasingly prioritizing what they view as information sovereignty. Whether targeting liberal media outlets, pro-Russian influencers, or independent journalists, the common thread is a concerted effort to control narratives within their borders.

From Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan, these actions reflect a growing consensus among Central Asian elites: foreign narratives, whether from Russia, the West, or elsewhere, are increasingly seen not as pluralism but as threats to national unity.

Women Who Wear Niqab in Public in Kazakhstan to Risk Fines Under New Law

The Mazhilis, the lower house of the Kazakh parliament, has approved in its second reading a draft law “On the Prevention of Offenses,” which introduces fines for wearing a niqab, or other clothing that covers the face, preventing identification in public spaces.

The bill amends the Code of Administrative Offenses to include penalties for such violations. A first offense will result in a warning; a second offense will incur a fine of $78 under current rates, increasing to $86 from 2026.

A ban on face-covering garments, including both masks and niqabs, was first introduced in the summer of 2025. The new amendments formalize enforcement through administrative measures. Garments such as hijabs, sheilas, and khimars, which do not cover the face, remain permitted.

Similar measures have been adopted in other Central Asian countries, including Kyrgyzstan.

Beyond face coverings, the bill introduces liability for posting and distributing illegal content and for failing to comply with official instructions to remedy violations. It also expands the powers of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, allowing it to hold officials from state and local executive bodies accountable for not implementing civil protection measures intended to prevent natural or man-made emergencies.

Debate over banning the niqab has persisted in Kazakhstan for years. Despite public resistance from some groups, authorities have finalized the decision, citing national security and efforts to counter extremism.

Revolut Blocks Top-Ups from Central Asian Bank Cards for EU-Based Users

Russian citizens residing in the European Union have reported being unable to top up their Revolut accounts using bank cards issued in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. According to Oninvest, at least five individuals encountered the same issue, with Revolut rejecting the transfers and stating that the cards used are “no longer supported.”

Revolut’s customer support confirmed that as of December 1, the bank no longer processes top-ups from cards issued in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan for users living in EU member states. The restriction is not temporary; the bank said similar transactions will not be accepted going forward. Notably, none of the banks in question are subject to international sanctions.

Revolut attributed the change to internal policies and updated compliance requirements from international payment systems. These systems have reportedly classified Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan as high-risk jurisdictions for card-based top-up operations. The bank emphasized that the decision was mandated by its payment partners, not initiated by Revolut itself.

Users also reported that top-up attempts through mobile apps of Central Asian banks resulted in error messages. However, Revolut advised that alternative methods, such as Apple Pay, Google Pay, and international bank transfers, remain available.

Some customers based in France received a notification from Revolut stating that the platform will no longer accept card transfers from 52 countries. The list includes several countries where Russians relocated after 2022, such as Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkey, Serbia, and the UAE, as well as popular travel destinations like Thailand and Vietnam.

Kyrgyzstan Government Temporarily Bans Road Coal Exports as Shipments to China Surge

On December 3, the government of Kyrgyzstan imposed a six-month ban on the export of coal by road transport. The restriction aims to stabilize the domestic market amid rising demand and does not apply to shipments passing through the Irkeshtam and Torugart checkpoints on the border with China.

Despite its environmental impact, coal remains a critical fuel source for winter heating in Kyrgyzstan, which continues to face chronic electricity shortages. In an effort to curb domestic price increases, the government introduced temporary state regulation of coal prices in September, effective for 90 days.

While domestic needs remain high, coal is also a key export commodity. China has emerged as a growing destination for Kyrgyz coal, with exports reaching 11,600 tons in September 2025, the highest monthly volume recorded this year, according to China’s General Administration of Customs.

Data from the National Statistics Committee of Kyrgyzstan shows that in 2024, the country exported 1.1 million tons of coal worth $52.7 million. Uzbekistan remained the largest buyer, importing 996,600 tons. However, exports to China surged to 118,200 tons, up from just 13,000 tons in 2023.

In late November, Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Adylbek Kasymaliev visited the Torugart border checkpoint and the newly opened Torugart-1 coal mine, which began operations on November 12. Kyrgyzkomur OJSC, the national coal company, holds the exploration license for a 557.6-hectare section of the deposit in the At-Bashy District of Naryn Province. Total reserves are estimated at 423,400 tons.

Kasymaliev instructed officials to ensure stable operations at the site and to initiate coal exports from the Torugart-1 mine as soon as possible.

China’s Power Play in Central Asia’s Energy Sector

China is steadily expanding its influence in Central Asia’s oil and gas sector through multi-billion-dollar investments, long-term supply agreements, and a growing network of strategic partnerships. From Kazakhstan to Turkmenistan, Beijing’s state-backed companies are securing key upstream and midstream assets, financing new petrochemical and pipeline projects, and positioning themselves as indispensable players in the region’s resource development.

This expansion is driven not only by China’s rising energy demand, but also by Beijing’s ambition to establish durable overland energy corridors that reduce reliance on maritime routes vulnerable to disruption. Central Asia’s existing and planned pipelines provide China with rare direct access to oil and gas fields across its western frontier, making the region a focal point of its broader energy-security strategy and a cornerstone of Beijing’s efforts to diversify supply while deepening political and economic footholds across Eurasia.

Kazakhstan Eyes Chinese Investment Amid Lukoil Sanctions

Kazakhstan may seek to transfer Russian company Lukoil’s stake in the offshore Kalamkas-Khazar oil and gas project to a new partner, with some industry channels, including the Telegram channel Energy Monitor, speculating about possible Chinese interest.

Lukoil, which has been targeted by Western sanctions, is reportedly planning to exit Kalamkas-Khazar Operating LLP, a joint venture with KazMunayGas (KMG). Each company currently holds a 50% stake. Some commentators have suggested that a Chinese investor could step in, but no replacement has been officially confirmed.

Seconded engineers from KMG Engineering are expected to be withdrawn from the project as of January 1, 2026, with several Kalamkas-Khazar staff members temporarily reassigned to other KMG subsidiaries until a new partner is confirmed.

The project is considered highly promising, with earlier estimates citing reserves of 81 million tons of oil and 22 billion cubic meters of gas. New exploration has identified additional oil-bearing structures. A final investment decision (FID) worth more than $6.5 billion was originally expected by the end of 2025. However, U.S. sanctions against Lukoil have delayed progress.

Located 120 km from the Kashagan field in the North Caspian Basin, the Kalamkas-Khazar block comprises the Kalamkas-More and Khazar fields. The site is situated in Kazakhstan’s Mangistau Region, 60 km from the Buzachi Peninsula.

KazMunayGas Chairman Askhat Khasenov previously confirmed that production was expected to begin in 2028-2029, with peak output reaching four million tons annually. Lukoil was sanctioned by the UK on October 15, followed by the U.S., complicating ongoing negotiations. Despite this, major projects where Lukoil holds minority stakes, such as Tengiz, Karachaganak, and the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, have not been impacted.

A Lukoil withdrawal would create a rare opening for China to secure its first significant offshore position in the North Caspian, a zone historically dominated by Western majors and Russian firms. Such an entry would represent a notable shift in Kazakhstan’s offshore partnership landscape.

Beijing’s Billion-Dollar Energy Deals in Kazakhstan

In September 2025, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev announced a series of energy deals with China valued at $1.5 billion. During his official visit to China, more than 70 commercial agreements totaling approximately $15 billion were signed, several directly involving Kazakhstan’s oil and gas sector.

The breadth of agreements indicates that Kazakhstan is aiming to move beyond raw-resource exports and position itself as a regional petrochemical and processing hub integrated with Chinese industrial supply chains. Key projects include the construction of a gas chemical complex in the Aktobe Region to produce urea, with China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) expected to invest around $1 billion.

The China Development Bank has also signaled its readiness to finance the construction of trunk pipelines for transporting ethane and propane in the Atyrau Region, with investment volumes reported at around $530 million.

China’s CNOOC has been reported as receiving a contract for exploration and production at the Zhylyoi field in the Atyrau Region in June, and on December 3, KazMunayGas launched a joint venture with Sinopec to carry out geological surveys.

In October, KazMunayGas announced a new contract with a Sinopec subsidiary to explore and develop hydrocarbons in the Berezovsky area of the West Kazakhstan Region.

During a visit to China in August 2024, KMG Chairman Askhat Khasenov held high-level meetings with CNPC and Sinopec to discuss joint ventures in petrochemicals, geological exploration, refining, and transport. Among the projects was the urea complex, addressing Kazakhstan’s domestic demand of 350,000-400,000 tons annually.

Other initiatives include gas processing at the Urihtau field, expansion of the Shymkent Oil Refinery (PKOP LLP), and increasing capacity along the Atyrau-Kenkik and Kenkik-Kumkol oil pipelines. Additionally, talks covered plans to manufacture polyethylene, terephthalic acid (TFC), and polyethylene terephthalate (PET), with total investments that could exceed $8 billion.

Many of these projects fall under the China–Kazakhstan Industrial Capacity Cooperation framework, which Beijing uses to export Chinese engineering, technology, and financing models abroad.

Despite strengthening ties with Beijing, Kazakh officials stress that the country remains open to investment from the U.S., Russia, and the European Union. The development of Kazakhstan’s fuel and energy complex remains a central pillar of the national economic strategy.

China’s Deepening Energy Ties with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan

China is also solidifying its energy partnerships with Uzbekistan. In October, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Energy met with a CNPC delegation led by Chairman Dai Houliang to discuss projects such as the Central Asia-China gas pipeline, new gas condensate field development in the Bukhara Region, underground storage construction, and workforce training for the energy sector.

CNPC’s direct investments in Uzbekistan now exceed $5 billion. Through its joint venture with Uzbekneftegaz, CNPC has built parts of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline, developed the Mingbulak oil field, and modernized the Bukhara refinery.

Uzbekistan has embraced Chinese financing as it works to reverse declining gas output and manage recurring domestic shortages, making Beijing an increasingly vital partner in stabilizing the sector.

In Turkmenistan, CNPC is developing the fourth phase of the massive Galkynysh gas field, with a planned annual capacity of ten billion cubic meters. This project follows high-level talks between President Serdar Berdimuhamedov and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing in September.

China currently imports about 40 billion cubic meters of Turkmen gas annually via three pipeline routes: A, B, and C. With the completion of Line D, total export capacity is expected to rise to 65 billion cubic meters per year.

Turkmenistan sends more than 80% of its gas exports to China, giving Beijing unparalleled leverage in the country’s energy sector and making the completion of Line D strategically important for both sides.

China’s Emerging Dominance in Central Asia’s Energy Architecture

Taken together, these developments show how China is embedding itself across the entire Central Asian energy ecosystem, not only as a buyer of hydrocarbons but increasingly as a financier, operator, and industrial partner. Beijing’s state-backed companies are moving upstream into exploration and production, downstream into petrochemicals and refining, and horizontally into pipeline construction, gas storage, and equipment manufacturing. This multi-layered presence is allowing China to shape investment decisions, infrastructure layout, and export routes across Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.

By leveraging long-term financing, rapid project execution, and integration into Chinese supply chains, Beijing is steadily building structural influence in a region where Russia once dominated and where Western companies now play more selective roles. The result is an emerging energy order in which China is positioned not simply as a commercial actor, but as a central external power capable of setting the pace and direction of the region’s resource development.

Over Half a Million Tons of Cargo Blocked from Entering Kyrgyzstan in 2025 Over Phytosanitary Violations

In the first 11 months of 2025, Kyrgyzstan’s Department of Plant Protection, Quarantine, and Chemicalization detected 35 cases of non-compliance with phytosanitary requirements at border checkpoints. As a result, 562.5 tons of agricultural cargo were denied entry and returned to the countries of origin.

According to the agency, authorities also blocked the import of more than 70,000 plant seedlings, over 11,000 flowers, and 136 cubic meters of lumber. Diplomatic notes regarding the violations were formally sent to China and the Netherlands.

Violating shipments were either returned, destroyed, or decontaminated, the agency said.

Officials emphasized that phytosanitary controls are a vital component of the country’s environmental safety strategy. These measures are intended to prevent the entry of dangerous quarantine organisms and to safeguard Kyrgyzstan’s agricultural sector and export capabilities.

Border Challenges with Kazakhstan and Russia

Despite efforts to maintain phytosanitary integrity, Kyrgyz exporters continue to face challenges at regional borders. A significant portion of Kyrgyz agricultural exports transit through Kazakhstan to reach Russia. However, Russian authorities frequently reject these shipments, citing non-compliance with their own import standards.

This has led to growing criticism of Kyrgyz representatives at the Eurasian Economic Commission, with farmers accusing them of failing to effectively advocate for the interests of domestic producers.

In response, the Department of Plant Protection and Quarantine has increased outreach to farmers and freight carriers, urging them to meet export quality standards and ensure that accompanying documents are completed correctly.

Compounding the issue, cargo delays at the Kyrgyz-Kazakh border remain common, with transport operators sometimes waiting for several weeks. Similar bottlenecks occur periodically at the Kazakhstan-Russia border. Many Kyrgyz businesses view these delays as unjustified, given that Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Russia are all members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which guarantees the free movement of goods among member states.