India–Central Asia: Connectivity, Security, and Sustainable Partnerships in a Multipolar World
A widening conflict in West Asia is forcing India and Central Asia to reassess trade routes, diplomacy, and regional security, with key projects such as Iran’s Chabahar port now facing growing uncertainty. These risks framed discussions in New Delhi on March 25–26, where experts gathered under the banner of “India–Central Asia: Connectivity, Security, and Sustainable Partnerships in a Multipolar World,” with The Times of Central Asia in attendance.
The conference unfolded against the backdrop of two active Eurasian wars—the Russo-Ukrainian and the Israel/U.S.-Iran conflict. Central Asian and Indian participants agreed that the West Asian crisis is widening, putting not only ports and logistics routes but also economies across the globe under serious threat. India's Chabahar link to Afghanistan and Central Asia is now a high-risk, uncertain investment, weakening overall continental strategic thinking across Eurasia, including efforts to consolidate new trans-Caspian trade corridors. If the conflict cripples or destroys Chabahar, years of progress, hard-won partnerships, and millions in strategic investment would be erased.
On the sidelines, some participants suggested that India could help cool what's becoming a dangerously global conflict. Unbeknownst to them, India had already held an all-party meeting on March 25 on the West Asia crisis. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar's message: India will not mediate. The revelation surprised some participants—others, not at all. In any event, Central Asian states, in principle, have backed any diplomatic push for peace.
With West Asia in turmoil and platitudes in abundance, conference participants emphasized the need to rethink geopolitics, trade, security, and cultural ties beyond stale frameworks at a time of conflict. Four themes defined the Central and South Asian moment: the dangers of bloc politics, even as regional organizations continue to evolve and expand their influence, the ascendancy of national interests over external pressure, and the emergence of a firm refusal to pick sides in the midst of frictions between competing global pressures.
Dr. Raj Kumar Sharma, a member of the India Central Asia Foundation, stated: “The conference provided an important platform to move beyond theoretical discussion and toward practical engagement. With Central Asia’s ambassadors to India present, we focused on exploring concrete mechanisms to promote peace through sustained diplomatic efforts. Despite the proximity of the conflict in West Asia to both Central Asia and India, participants expressed confidence that dialogue and restraint – buttressed by trade and investment – will ultimately guide outcomes, with particular concern for civilians and those enduring hardship. Notably, the crisis did not overshadow the conference’s primary agenda or its scholarly contributions. Overall, the gathering can be seen as a constructive step in reinforcing diplomatic initiatives dedicated to peace and stability in a conflict-affected region.”
The conference witnessed the release of three significant publications on India–Central Asia relations: India – Kazakhstan Partnership in a Changing Geopolitical Order (eds. Ramakant Dwivedi, Lalit Aggarwal, Kuralay Baizakova), Manas: Kirgiz Vir Gatha Kavya by Ramakant Dwivedi & Hemchandra Pandey and India and Central, East and Southeast Asia: Enhancing the Partnership (eds. Ramakant Dwivedi & Lalit Aggarwal).
[caption id="attachment_46364" align="aligncenter" width="1379"]
(L-R): Dr Anita Sengupta, Dr Arvind Gupta, Dr Pramod Kumar, Ambassador Irina Orolbaeva, Dr Rachael M. Rudolph, Dr Beena & Dr Raj Kumar Sharma, who all spoke on the role of regional institutions in Central Asian development; image: TCA[/caption]
Geopolitics in Flux – Central Asia and the Emerging Multipolar Order
At the conference, a clear theme emerged: Central Asia holds an increasingly important place in an emerging multipolar world due to its geography and resources. As conflicts and power plays intensify, especially in West Asia, countries in the region must work to reshape security, trade, and diplomacy to better promote economic development through peace.
For Central Asia and India, understanding these geopolitical shifts is key to navigating risks and maintaining stability. The conference speakers emphasized that, confronted with shared threats, India and Central Asia need even deeper collaboration with Afghanistan through intelligence sharing, training, and joint mechanisms to bolster resilience and sustain regional stability within a complex global environment – this applies equally to the Afghan-Pakistan conflict currently unfolding. All participants underscored the importance of patience, peace, and sober foreign policies, while preserving sovereign autonomy and national interests within a multi-dimensional approach to diplomacy.
The Role of Regional Institutions in Central Asian Development
The participants highlighted that there are many regional institutions in Central Asia, most of which reflect the ideas, interests and needs of external powers. The Central Asian countries need to enhance regional cooperation mechanisms among themselves so that they become the real arbiters of their aspirations and development. Dr Raj Kumar Sharma and Dr Beena, Assistant Professor at MERI Centre for International Studies, highlighted that the Central Asian countries should focus on cooperative climate governance in the region and move towards a green transition collectively. Dr. Sharma called on Central Asia and India – with the agreement of all – to unite in advancing enduring peace and sustainable progress across the region.
Trade, Connectivity and Infrastructure – Challenges and Prospects for Regional Cooperation
Without stronger connectivity, Central Asia will never reach its full potential, conference participants concurred. Central Asian participants expressed their willingness and support for further integration through active multi-vector foreign policies in order to deal with their connectivity and infrastructure challenges. Turkmenistan’s position of maintaining its non-aligned status reflects its geo-economic priorities over geo-political gamesmanship.
Unsurprisingly, the Russo-Ukraine war has reconfirmed certain vulnerabilities of Central Asian countries given their dependence on transportation limitations and longstanding external links, necessitating a reexamination of trade routes, with all options on the table. In addition, sovereign autonomy means greater intra-regional self-reliance.
Since 2018, Consultative Meeting of Heads of States in Central Asia has become the main advisory mechanism for regional cooperation. Early signs of regional cooperation include agreements on joint border management and customs simplification, discussions on shared water and energy resource management, and coordinated positions in international forums. Both Central Asian and Indian participants highlighted that India should continue to reach out to all parties to the conflict in West Asia to safeguard their economic interests in Iran – this applies immediately to Chabahar Port and to oil exports in the first instance.
On the education front, participants noted that with visa barriers going up in America and elsewhere, Indian students are looking for alternative educational markets; Central Asia, in many ways, is ideal for many because it is geographically closer to India and the fees are relatively low. Indian students have become the largest group of international students in Kazakhstan, with nearly 10,000 to 12,000 enrolled as of 2025, marking a massive 211.9% increase from 2022 levels.
India – Central Asia: Historical and Cultural Ties
The organizers stressed that centuries of trade, migration, and cultural exchange have created lasting bonds between India and Central Asia—bonds that will drive future cooperation. India and Central Asia’s ancient economic ties—forged through the Silk Road and the Kushan Empire (which linked northern India with modern Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan)—were fractured by 19th‑century colonialism. Now, experts urge a clear path forward: reconstruct the geo-cultural bridge through education, joint publications, think tank outreach, and media collaboration.
Afghanistan Advances Qosh Tepa Canal While Urging Regional Water Cooperation
Uzbekistan just hosted the Tashkent Water Week forum, and the speaker many wanted to hear from was the representative from Afghanistan. Central Asia and Afghanistan are being hit hard by climate change. This region has endured several droughts already this decade, and indications are that this year will bring drought again.
Hanging over the forum was Afghanistan’s plan to complete the Qosh-Tepa Canal in 2028, which will draw water from a river that Central Asian countries also use and further complicate the regional water situation.
[caption id="attachment_18865" align="aligncenter" width="1280"]
Qosh Tepa Canal, artist's rendition; image: TCA, Aleksandr Potolitsyn[/caption]
Our Fair Share
The forum, which actually spanned only two days, March 25-26, brought together some 80 speakers and more than 1,200 delegates from 19 countries.
In the past five years, Central Asia has seen noticeably diminished precipitation, melting glaciers, and record high temperatures, making water conservation a priority. The last days of March saw temperatures soar into the 30s Celsius in southern Kazakhstan. In both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, there were record-high temperatures in February. Rainfall for the last three months of 2025 was also far below normal across Central Asia.
When the Taliban government announced in early 2022 that it would build the 285-kilometer-long, 100-meter-wide, 8.5-meter-deep Qosh Tepa to irrigate lands in northern Afghanistan, it added another water concern to Central Asia, particularly the governments in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
Afghanistan’s Deputy Minister of Water and Energy, Mujeeb-ur-Rahman Omar, led the Afghan delegation at the Tashkent Water Week. At the forum, he repeated his government’s position that historically, Afghanistan has taken only very small volumes of water from the Amu-Darya River basin, while its northern neighbors have been using large amounts for irrigation for decades.
“We believe in the fair and sustainable development of the region,” Omar said, adding, “We intend to develop (water resources) on a legal basis, in accordance with the legal rights of the countries in the region.“
Omar is correct that under international law, Afghanistan has an equal right to water from the Amu-Darya, one of Central Asia’s two great rivers. The river currently marks the border between Afghanistan to the south, and Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and a small section of Turkmenistan to the north.
There is no separate regional water use agreement between the Central Asian states and Afghanistan. Since none of the Central Asian governments officially recognize the Taliban as the legitimate Afghan government, Russia is the only country that does at the moment, there is no possibility of a legal treaty on water use being signed.
So, shortly after the construction of the canal is finished in 2028, some 20% of the water in the Amu-Darya, starting from the point just west of the Tajik-Uzbek border, will be diverted into the Qosh Tepa canal.
It is already clear that this will mean the end of some downstream communities in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan that are on the edge of the Kara-Kum Desert and which are already under strain from insufficient water supplies.
Turkmenistan did not send a delegation to the Tashkent Water Week forum.
Uzbekistan’s Minister of Water Resources, Shavkat Khamrayev, summed up the situation in March 2025, conceding Afghanistan’s right to its share of water, and there was no other choice.
“Should we take up arms and go to war?’ Khamrayev asked.
[caption id="attachment_12053" align="aligncenter" width="2560"]
Abandoned boats on the former Aral seabed reflect the legacy of water diversion in Central Asia.; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption]
The Taliban Wants Help
At the Tashkent forum, Omar said Afghanistan would always consider the rights and needs of its northern neighbors for water. He stressed cooperation with Central Asia, especially in sharing water-saving technologies that the Central Asian countries have been developing in recent years.
Omar specifically appealed to the Central Asian states, “in the spirit of regional cooperation,” to help with projects to solidify the banks of the Amu-Darya on the Afghan side of the river. Omar said soil erosion was washing away sections of the river’s bank, leading to the loss of water.
Uzbekistan’s government has offered several times to help with the construction of the Qosh Tepa Canal. The Taliban are building the project on their own, and there have been concerns about safety and the quality of the workmanship.
Omar did not address this issue, but made it clear that the project will be finished. So far, more than 200 kilometers of the canal have been excavated.
Omar also spoke about regional efforts to combat climate change. In his opinion, “developed countries that have essentially caused climate change” should “help the countries that have become victims of climate change in conducting scientific research, monitoring, and assessing our needs.”
There was no mention in reports if that view was shared by others at the forum.
[caption id="attachment_25949" align="aligncenter" width="1280"]
Uzbek fishermen on the Amu Darya; image: Project Amu Darya[/caption]
Making the Best of It
On the sidelines of the forum, Omar met with Uzbek Water Resources chief Khamrayev to discuss water management.
The Afghan delegation’s presence at the forum was a good sign that the Taliban want to cooperate with Central Asia on the issue of water use. But with the memories of droughts in 2021, 2022, and 2023 still fresh in the minds of officials on both sides of the Afghan-Central Asian border, and with another drought likely this year, water use could quickly become a contentious issue once again before the Afghan canal is even completed.
Kyrgyzstan Elected First Vice-Chair of UN Mountain Partnership
Kyrgyzstan has been elected First Vice-Chair of the Steering Committee of the Mountain Partnership for the 2026-2030 period, reflecting its continued engagement in advancing the global mountain agenda. Founded in 2002, the Mountain Partnership is a United Nations alliance of governments and organizations aimed at improving the livelihoods of mountain communities and protecting mountain ecosystems. The initiative was established by the governments of Italy and Switzerland, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the Food and Agriculture Organization, which hosts the partnership’s secretariat. The new Steering Committee was elected during the 7th Global Meeting of the Mountain Partnership, held from March 26 to 28 in Andorra under the theme “Mountains for the Future: Responsible Tourism, Thriving Communities.” The meeting brought together representatives from Germany, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Italy, Mongolia, Montenegro, Nepal, and Kyrgyzstan, as well as officials from international organizations including FAO, UN Tourism, UNESCO, the OSCE, UNEP, the United Nations Development Programme, and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Italy, the partnership’s main donor, retained its position as Chair. Kyrgyzstan was represented by Dinara Kemelova, the president’s special representative for the mountain agenda, who called for stronger coordination among mountain countries to advance shared priorities on global platforms. Kemelova also announced that the second “Bishkek+25” Global Mountain Summit will be held in Kyrgyzstan from October 21 to 23, 2027. She highlighted the country’s implementation of the Five Years of Action for the Development of Mountain Regions (2023-2027), with a focus on ecotourism and organic production. An exhibition of Kyrgyz mountain products was also organized on the sidelines of the meeting. The meeting concluded with the adoption of the Andorra Declaration, a strategic document aimed at strengthening international commitment to sustainable mountain development. The declaration recognizes the role of mountains in combating climate change, preserving biodiversity, and ensuring food security, while also highlighting their vulnerability to global environmental impacts. Mountains cover around one quarter of the Earth’s land surface and are home to approximately 1.2 billion people, while also encompassing 25 of the world’s 36 biodiversity hotspots. The document outlines several priority areas, including promoting sustainable tourism as a key economic driver for mountain regions, increasing climate and environmental financing, strengthening research and scientific cooperation, and supporting local communities, including women, youth, and indigenous groups. It also emphasizes the need to improve connectivity in mountain areas, reduce the digital divide, and enhance resilience to natural hazards through early warning systems and adapted infrastructure.
Kyrgyzstan Moves Toward Power Consolidation Ahead of 2027 Election
Kyrgyzstan has changed leaders more often than any other country in Central Asia, with power shifts since independence driven by both elections and unrest. With less than ten months remaining before the next presidential vote on January 24, 2027, recent political developments suggest the authorities are now moving to consolidate control well ahead of the contest. Against this backdrop, Russian political analyst Arkady Dubnov, citing sources in Kyrgyzstan, has suggested that recent political decisions, including the sudden removal of Kamchybek Tashiyev on February 10, may be linked to efforts to manage regional and institutional tensions within the country. In particular, discussions since that decision have focused on the long-standing dynamics between northern and southern elites. This dynamic has historically shaped political competition in the country. Recent personnel changes within state institutions have targeted individuals previously associated with former officials. Such administrative reshuffling is not uncommon ahead of major political milestones, including elections, and may reflect efforts to consolidate governance structures ahead of the upcoming election cycle. Kyrgyz political analyst Kanat Nogoybaev, speaking to a Kazakhstani outlet, commented on a petition signed by a group of public figures calling for early presidential elections. He noted that such initiatives typically reflect broader political maneuvering within elite circles. Since the petition was signed, some reports indicate that several individuals connected to this petition have faced legal scrutiny, though details remain unclear. President Sadyr Japarov has addressed the removal of Tashiyev, emphasizing the importance of maintaining stability within state institutions and avoiding internal divisions among public servants. “I believe that by making a swift decision, I ensured stability within the system,” Japarov said in earlier remarks, stressing that unity within government structures remains a priority. Separately, there have been discussions in political circles regarding the review of past high-profile legal cases. Former Jogorku Kenesh (parliamentary) deputy Iskhak Masaliev has suggested reassessing certain cases from recent years. One such case involves journalist Makhabat Tazhibek kyzy, whose legal proceedings have attracted significant public attention. In March, the Supreme Court remanded her case for retrial, and her pretrial detention was changed to house arrest. The case is part of a broader investigation involving media professionals detained in January 2024 on charges related to public unrest. Judicial proceedings in these cases remain ongoing. Economic developments have also intersected with recent political discussions. Investigations involving the state company, Kyrgyzneftegaz, have led to the detention of several individuals, including company executives and former officials. The Kyrgyz authorities have stated that these actions are part of broader efforts to ensure transparency and accountability in the management of state assets. Officials from the State Tax Service have addressed the case, noting that new conditions allowed for a comprehensive audit of the company. Subsequent legal actions were taken following the findings. These developments add an economic dimension to the broader political shifts underway. In parallel, Kyrgyzneftegaz has announced a general shareholders’ meeting scheduled for April 16 in Kochkor-Ata. The agenda includes governance changes, amendments to internal documents, and financial restructuring measures. While the authorities continue to emphasize stability and institutional continuity, recent developments have prompted closer scrutiny of how political and administrative changes may shape Kyrgyzstan’s leadership landscape ahead of 2027.
EAEU Trade Frictions Deepen Despite Shymkent Integration Push
The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) met in Shymkent on March 26-27 with a long agenda and a familiar promise: deeper integration, smoother trade, and a more modern common market. Kazakhstan, which holds the bloc’s 2026 chairmanship, used the meeting to push artificial intelligence, digital logistics, industrial cooperation, and the removal of internal barriers. Twelve documents were signed, covering areas including industrial cooperation, transport, and digital integration.
“Kazakhstan aims to become a fully-fledged digital country. We have built a modern ecosystem, including Astana Hub and the Alem.ai AI center, and are ready to share experience with EAEU partners on digital regulation and economic transformation,” Kazakh Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov stated.
That sounds ambitious, but it also highlights the bloc’s central weakness. The EAEU has no shortage of plans; it has a shortage of trust between its members, and that matters more. The dynamics extend across the bloc, but are most visible in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
The EAEU was built to ensure the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor across Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. But the reality keeps drifting away from the treaty. Kazakhstan’s chairmanship agenda calls for a barrier-free internal market, yet the bloc is entering a new phase of tighter controls, retaliatory measures, and disputes over who really benefits.
Shymkent made that contradiction impossible to miss. Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov promoted an AI-based system to coordinate cargo flows across the union and speed up transit. He also backed the full electronic handling of veterinary and phytosanitary checks, all of which are practical ideas. Central Asia needs faster, cheaper, and more predictable logistics, but digital tools do not solve a political problem. A system becomes more efficient only if its members want it to be open. When they want leverage instead, technology can only make the controls smarter.
[caption id="attachment_46024" align="aligncenter" width="1920"]
Image: primeminister.kz[/caption]
Kazakhstan’s priorities already show where the friction lies. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev opened his chairmanship by calling for digital transformation, better transport links, and the elimination of internal trade barriers. He also pushed a stronger external profile for the EAEU, with wider links across Asia, the Arab world, and the Global South. That is a serious agenda for a bloc trying to present itself as a Eurasian logistics hub. That push for external expansion comes at a time when internal frictions are becoming harder to manage. It sits uneasily beside everyday trade practice inside the union, where growing trade disputes have become part of the EAEU’s normal life, not an exception to it.
The clearest recent example is Russia’s SPOT import-control system, which takes effect for road shipments from EAEU countries on April 1. Importers must submit shipment information two days before trucks reach the border and receive a QR code. Moscow has presented the change as a tax-compliance and anti-fraud measure, with additional financial guarantees expected in later phases of its implementation. In practice, it adds cost, time, and uncertainty before goods even reach the border, the opposite of what a customs union is supposed to do. New Russian trade controls are technical on paper, but they change how power works inside the bloc.
The controls already fit into a wider pattern. Border checks and documentation controls have tightened on the Kazakhstan-Russia frontier, and scrutiny of product labeling and paperwork has grown stricter. Businesses now face a system in which “free movement” exists in law, but not in practice. That gap is politically corrosive because it hits the smaller members hardest. Russia can absorb delays and redesign procedures. Kazakhstan also faces rising costs from disruptions, while smaller economies such as Kyrgyzstan feel them more immediately.
Kyrgyzstan has been blunt about that pressure. Earlier this month, Bishkek asked the Eurasian Economic Commission to remove import duties on a group of socially important goods, including flour, vegetable oil, fruits and vegetables, and cocoa powder. The logic was simple: global inflation is still feeding into domestic prices, and smaller members of the bloc need more flexible trade tools than their larger partners. That request made economic sense for Kyrgyzstan, but it also showed how uneven the union remains. When a member needs emergency tariff relief on basic goods to manage price pressure, the common market isn’t functioning on equal terms. Kyrgyzstan’s push for lower import duties came just a week before the Shymkent meeting.
The same imbalance appears in labor. One of the EAEU’s strongest selling points has always been access to the Russian labor market, especially for Kyrgyzstan. That benefit should be real, giving migrants easier legal access to jobs, simpler registration, and better tax regimes. But labor mobility has never been as stable as the bloc’s rhetoric suggests. In January, Kyrgyzstan took Russia to the EAEU court over compulsory medical insurance for migrants’ family members. In March, the court clarified that member states do not have to issue that coverage automatically. The case exposed a basic truth: labor access inside the EAEU is still vulnerable to national limits when politics hardens. Kyrgyzstan’s experience inside the union captures that well.
Kazakhstan has its own reasons to push back more openly. On March 10, Industry and Construction Minister Yersayin Nagaspayev said Kazakhstan would mirror Russia’s higher recycling fee on imported cars as part of efforts to support the domestic industry. That is not the language of seamless integration; it is the language of reciprocal pressure. Once that logic takes hold, the EAEU stops looking like a common market and starts looking like a managed bargaining arena.
None of this means the EAEU is collapsing. Its economic weight is still large, and its members continue to find value in it. Mutual trade in goods has roughly doubled since 2015, reaching close to $100 billion in 2024, according to the Eurasian Economic Commission. In 2024 alone, mutual trade in goods rose by around 9%. The Eurasian Economic Commission says most settlements now take place in national currencies, accounting for over 90% of transactions inside the union. Those are not minor gains. They explain why no member is walking away.
But Shymkent showed where the EAEU stands in 2026. It is good at producing strategies, roadmaps, and digital concepts, but much weaker at guaranteeing that member states will restrain themselves when their interests come first. Kazakhstan’s chairmanship has chosen the right themes: logistics, digitalization, and fewer barriers. The problem is that the union’s real barriers are now political. Until members stop using trade rules, border procedures, and regulatory measures as instruments of pressure, the EAEU will keep modernizing its systems without fixing its core defect. It can integrate its platforms faster than it integrates its interests.
The next intergovernmental meeting is set for Cholpon-Ata, Kyrgyzstan, in early August.
The Iran Conflict Is Stress-Testing Central Asia’s Southern Corridors
Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s proposal of Turkestan city as a venue for Iran-war negotiations shows how directly the conflict had already begun to affect Central Asia itself. The region is no longer simply observing events in Iran. By the time Tokayev made the offer, Central Asian governments were already dealing with evacuations, route disruption, emergency diplomatic coordination, and growing concern over the war’s economic effects. The Iran war has thus become a real test of Central Asia’s southern diversification strategy. Governments across the region have, in recent years, sought to widen access to world markets through Iran, the South Caucasus, and, in some cases, Afghanistan and Pakistan. These channels reduce dependence on northern routes by opening access to Türkiye, Europe, Gulf markets, and the Indian Ocean. The present crisis subjects that strategy to wartime conditions. The strain of war makes it easier to distinguish durable links, conditional ones, and routes that remain more aspirational than real. The C6 and Crisis Coordination The first effects have been practical. Turkmenistan has opened four additional checkpoints along its frontier with Iran, supplementing the Serakhs crossing, while Azerbaijan’s overland route through Astara became another critical outlet, evacuating 312 people from 17 countries between February 28 and March 2. Turkmenistan, according to official reporting, transited more than 200 foreign citizens from 16 countries during the same period. Uzbekistan used the Turkmen route to repatriate its citizens, while Kazakhstan directed its nationals toward overland exits through Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Türkiye. The war is already affecting borders, consular work, and the regional diplomatic agenda. This immediate response gives sharper political meaning to the widening of the Central Asian C5 into a C6 with Azerbaijan. The March 2 call among the five Central Asian foreign ministers and Azerbaijan showed that the format was already there to be used under pressure. What had until now appeared mainly as a corridor framework shaped by summit diplomacy and expert work appeared instead as a working format for crisis coordination linking Central Asia to the South Caucasus. The C6 idea is becoming more practical and more overtly diplomatic. The Organization of Turkic States adds a second, broader layer. Its foreign ministers met in Istanbul on March 7 and issued a joint statement expressing concern over the escalation in the Middle East, condemning actions that endanger civilians, warning against further regional destabilization, and affirming that threats to the security and interests of member states concern the organization as a whole. The statement was cautious, and the OTS is not turning into a military instrument. Even so, the war is testing whether a Turkic political space extending from Turkey through the South Caucasus to Central Asia can do more than express concern as regional security deteriorates. The C6 is becoming a working format for immediate coordination, while the OTS remains the broader political frame within which that coordination takes on institutional meaning. Corridor Stress and Resilience The trans-Iran transit option offers Central Asia a continuous land arc from regional railheads and road networks onward to Türkiye and connected European systems, with the further possibility of reaching southern ports on the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf. Under ordinary conditions, that continuity is its main advantage over routes that require repeated port and rail transfers: it reduces transshipment points, shortens the route in practice, and can make timing more predictable. Under wartime conditions, however, the same corridor is exposed to airspace closures, border disruption, sanctions complications, financing friction, insurance risk, and broader political uncertainty. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or Middle Corridor, avoids Iran-linked routes and instead depends on a more segmented chain. It relies on port capacity, scheduling, and political stability across a wider set of nodes: rail or road to Caspian shipping ports such as Aktau or Kuryk, sea passage across the Caspian, and stable conditions in the South Caucasus to keep traffic moving on time through Azerbaijan and Georgia toward Türkiye and Europe. Tehran’s March 5 drone strike on Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave, one of the most serious recent incidents in bilateral relations, showed how directly the conflict could affect the Middle Corridor. Uzbekistan complicates the picture because alternatives through Afghanistan and Pakistan toward the Arabian Sea and Gulf markets pass through it. Uzbekistan is not just a single-corridor user. It is one of the main gateways for several southward routes at once: west-southwest through Turkmenistan and Iran, south through Afghanistan toward Pakistani ports, and east-west through projects linking China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan more closely to downstream routes. None of these options can simply substitute for another, and none escapes the wider instability to the south. Current conditions cast doubt on all of them. The war is testing not just routes through Iran but the broader logic of southward diversification. Second-order Stress Transmission The same pressure is now visible in the skies. Europe-Asia flight patterns have already shifted as carriers avoid Iranian and other risky airspace. TCA reported that Central Asia’s airspace has value not as a substitute for Gulf hubs but in a narrower, more practical sense, as overflight space when southern corridors become harder to use. The European Union Aviation Safety Agency has meanwhile kept in force a conflict-zone bulletin warning operators about Iranian and neighboring airspace. Disruption in the usual geometry of Europe-Asia air traffic increases the importance of Central Asia’s skies. TCA also noted early in the crisis that a wider conflict could reverberate across Central Asia through rising energy prices and pressure on major transport corridors. Spillover from the Iran war affects not only routes that stop functioning. It also forces airlines onto longer routes with higher fuel costs, alters shipping and insurance calculations, and raises logistics costs more generally. The cost, timing, and insurability of goods movement to and through landlocked Central Asia already depend on long-distance logistics. Changes here channel the effects of a distant war into domestic economies. Turkmenistan offers the clearest early sign of how fast an Iranian supply shock can spread across Central Asia. Retailers and consumers in Ashgabat have told Reuters that prices for key goods imported from Iran have risen sharply because cross-border trade has slowed. Kyrgyzstan has also seen direct disruption of logistics, forcing importers and logistics firms to seek alternative arrangements, as freight forwarders told TCA that cargo transit through Iran had effectively stopped. These are concrete examples of how the war’s shocks are spreading through Central Asia. The broader regional question is how far such pressures extend into Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan through fuel, shipping, construction inputs, consumer goods, and supply costs more generally. Implications for the Caspian Region and Beyond The conflict’s movement toward the Caspian Sea littoral broadens the stakes. Israeli strikes on Iranian naval targets in the Caspian brought the war into a maritime zone relevant to regional energy and transit flows. The issue is no longer limited to Gulf shipping or borderland evacuation. It now reaches into a maritime-energy space central to Central Asian economic security and wider Eurasian connectivity. For Central Asia, the immediate question is where resilience must now be strengthened: in evacuation coordination, alternative routes, transport-risk management, and protection against import shocks. The deeper question concerns regional agency. The current shock exposes logistical weak points. It could strengthen corridor diversification, but only if the region finds ways to act on those weaknesses rather than merely react to them. The wider Eurasian significance extends beyond Central Asia. China has an interest in containing instability to preserve reliable westward and southward corridors. Greater instability around the Caspian is not in Moscow’s interest, even if Russia may benefit when southern alternatives weaken. The European Union has a clear stake in resilient non-Russian connectivity across the Caspian and South Caucasus, not least because many of its current assumptions about Eurasian connectivity depend on those corridors functioning with reasonable predictability. The United States, for its part, has an interest in regional stability and in preventing Central Asia’s room for maneuver from narrowing under the pressure of war. The deeper question is whether Central Asia can remain connected on terms that preserve strategic flexibility across Eurasia in a more sharply divided order.
Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team examine a series of major developments across Central Asia, from the results of Kazakhstan's constitutional referendum to the announcement of new Chinese-funded border outposts and fortifications along Tajikistan's frontier. We also look at the continuing fallout from the security shake-up in Kyrgyzstan, with further arrests and resignations, as well as the increasingly strange foreign movements of Turkmenistan's senior leadership while war continues to rage just across the border in Iran, alongside Tehran's threats to strike Turkmen infrastructure. The episode then turns to the escalating conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan, where some of the heaviest fighting in months is raising fresh questions about border stability, regional security, and the risk of wider spillover. Finally, for our main story, we bring on a panel of experts to discuss the growing issues surrounding the Rogun Dam and its resettlement project, and how both are likely to affect the states downstream. On the show this week: - Eugene Simonov (Rivers Without Boundaries Coalition) - Mark Fodor (Coalition for Human Rights in Development)
Caspian Escalation Raises Stakes for Central Asia
Central Asia, which has increasingly sought to present itself as a coordinated actor on the global political stage, has until recently maintained a cautious, non-aligned stance regarding the escalation in the Middle East. However, attacks affecting infrastructure in the Caspian region have altered the diplomatic balance. The Caspian Sea is a critical transit zone for Central Asia, linking Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan and onward to European and Middle Eastern markets. It forms part of key east–west and north–south trade corridors that have gained importance since Russia’s war in Ukraine disrupted traditional transit routes. In recent years, regional dynamics have also been shaped by Azerbaijan’s growing engagement with Central Asian states, including its formal inclusion in the expanded Central Asian consultative format, which has effectively evolved from the C5 into the C6. Baku has played an important role in regional connectivity. It has developed close relations with both Turkey and Israel, factors that influence geopolitical calculations in the Caspian basin, which directly borders Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. This growing alignment has reinforced efforts to develop the Middle Corridor across the Caspian, linking Central Asia to Europe via the South Caucasus. Turkey maintains political, economic, and cultural influence in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan through the Organization of Turkic States. Russian political discourse has at times portrayed this cooperation as part of a broader pan-Turkic geopolitical project, a characterization widely dismissed by officials and analysts in Central Asia. Nevertheless, Astana and Baku continue to maintain strong relations with Ankara, a development that has periodically caused concern in Moscow. Under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kazakhstan has also strengthened ties with Gulf states. Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia have become significant investors in the country’s economy. In this context, Iranian attacks on Gulf states not directly involved in the conflict have shaped Astana’s diplomatic positioning during the current crisis. Reports of drone attacks widely blamed on Iran targeting the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan have further heightened regional tensions. At the initial stage of the escalation, Kazakhstan’s response was largely limited to diplomatic contacts with regional leaders. At the same time, several Central Asian countries, along with Azerbaijan, expressed concern over the humanitarian consequences of the conflict and began dispatching aid to Iran. Azerbaijan sent nearly 30 tons of food and medical supplies on March 10, followed by another 82 tons of humanitarian aid on March 18. Uzbekistan delivered approximately 120 tons of humanitarian supplies, including flour, vegetable oil, sugar, and canned food, according to regional media reports. Turkmenistan also sent humanitarian aid consisting of medicines, medical supplies, and other goods, primarily intended for children. The Tajik government reported sending a convoy of 110 heavy trucks carrying humanitarian cargo to Iran, with a total weight of 3,610 tons. The diplomatic environment shifted further after Israeli air strikes on March 18 targeting Iranian naval facilities in the Caspian Sea. According to Israeli military statements cited by international media, the targets included a major port of the Iranian Navy, where, reportedly, "dozens of ships were destroyed,” as well as “the central command post of the Iranian Navy and infrastructure used for the repair and maintenance of Iranian military vessels.” The basin is also central to regional energy flows, with offshore infrastructure, shipping routes, and pipeline-linked export systems connecting Caspian producers to global markets. Any expansion of conflict into this space raises risks for both energy exports and maritime transport. Security in the Caspian basin is a shared concern for both littoral states and their regional partners. According to analyst Denis Borisov, Iran’s Caspian transport infrastructure forms part of regional corridors used by Central Asian states, making stability in the basin strategically important. Kazakhstan, one of the five Caspian littoral states, began actively signaling support for de-escalation shortly after the strikes. On March 21, speaking in the Turkestan region, President Tokayev called for an end to attacks on civilian and economic targets and urged parties to engage in negotiations. He reiterated Kazakhstan’s readiness to host potential peace talks. On March 22, the presidents of Kazakhstan and Iran exchanged congratulatory messages on the occasion of Eid al-Fitr and Nauryz. Tokayev expressed hopes for strengthened unity and stability in the Middle East. Diplomatic contacts intensified on March 23, when Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov held a telephone conversation with his Iranian counterpart Seyed Abbas Araghchi to discuss regional developments and possible steps toward reducing military tensions, including the need to maintain security in the Caspian region. On the same day, Turkmenistan’s Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov also spoke with Araghchi. Iranian readouts of the call warned that recent strikes could have security and environmental consequences for the Caspian Sea. Also on March 23, Tokayev received the United Arab Emirates Ambassador to Kazakhstan, Mohammed Said Mohammed al-Ariqi. During the meeting, Tokayev expressed concern over Iranian bombardments targeting the UAE, reiterated Kazakhstan’s opposition to involving neutral states in the conflict, and once again offered Kazakhstan as a platform for peace talks. The escalation affecting the Caspian region has therefore acted as a catalyst for intensified diplomatic engagement by Central Asian states and Azerbaijan aimed at steering the crisis toward dialogue. As Tokayev has suggested, such efforts may prove critical before the window for negotiated solutions narrows. As the conflict edges closer to key transit and energy routes, the stakes for Central Asia are no longer peripheral, but immediate.
Sunkar Podcast
Central Asia and the Troubled Southern Route
