Kyrgyzstan Elected First Vice-Chair of UN Mountain Partnership
Kyrgyzstan has been elected First Vice-Chair of the Steering Committee of the Mountain Partnership for the 2026-2030 period, reflecting its continued engagement in advancing the global mountain agenda. Founded in 2002, the Mountain Partnership is a United Nations alliance of governments and organizations aimed at improving the livelihoods of mountain communities and protecting mountain ecosystems. The initiative was established by the governments of Italy and Switzerland, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the Food and Agriculture Organization, which hosts the partnership’s secretariat. The new Steering Committee was elected during the 7th Global Meeting of the Mountain Partnership, held from March 26 to 28 in Andorra under the theme “Mountains for the Future: Responsible Tourism, Thriving Communities.” The meeting brought together representatives from Germany, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Italy, Mongolia, Montenegro, Nepal, and Kyrgyzstan, as well as officials from international organizations including FAO, UN Tourism, UNESCO, the OSCE, UNEP, the United Nations Development Programme, and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Italy, the partnership’s main donor, retained its position as Chair. Kyrgyzstan was represented by Dinara Kemelova, the president’s special representative for the mountain agenda, who called for stronger coordination among mountain countries to advance shared priorities on global platforms. Kemelova also announced that the second “Bishkek+25” Global Mountain Summit will be held in Kyrgyzstan from October 21 to 23, 2027. She highlighted the country’s implementation of the Five Years of Action for the Development of Mountain Regions (2023-2027), with a focus on ecotourism and organic production. An exhibition of Kyrgyz mountain products was also organized on the sidelines of the meeting. The meeting concluded with the adoption of the Andorra Declaration, a strategic document aimed at strengthening international commitment to sustainable mountain development. The declaration recognizes the role of mountains in combating climate change, preserving biodiversity, and ensuring food security, while also highlighting their vulnerability to global environmental impacts. Mountains cover around one quarter of the Earth’s land surface and are home to approximately 1.2 billion people, while also encompassing 25 of the world’s 36 biodiversity hotspots. The document outlines several priority areas, including promoting sustainable tourism as a key economic driver for mountain regions, increasing climate and environmental financing, strengthening research and scientific cooperation, and supporting local communities, including women, youth, and indigenous groups. It also emphasizes the need to improve connectivity in mountain areas, reduce the digital divide, and enhance resilience to natural hazards through early warning systems and adapted infrastructure.
Kyrgyzstan Moves Toward Power Consolidation Ahead of 2027 Election
Kyrgyzstan has changed leaders more often than any other country in Central Asia, with power shifts since independence driven by both elections and unrest. With less than ten months remaining before the next presidential vote on January 24, 2027, recent political developments suggest the authorities are now moving to consolidate control well ahead of the contest. Against this backdrop, Russian political analyst Arkady Dubnov, citing sources in Kyrgyzstan, has suggested that recent political decisions, including the sudden removal of Kamchybek Tashiyev on February 10, may be linked to efforts to manage regional and institutional tensions within the country. In particular, discussions since that decision have focused on the long-standing dynamics between northern and southern elites. This dynamic has historically shaped political competition in the country. Recent personnel changes within state institutions have targeted individuals previously associated with former officials. Such administrative reshuffling is not uncommon ahead of major political milestones, including elections, and may reflect efforts to consolidate governance structures ahead of the upcoming election cycle. Kyrgyz political analyst Kanat Nogoybaev, speaking to a Kazakhstani outlet, commented on a petition signed by a group of public figures calling for early presidential elections. He noted that such initiatives typically reflect broader political maneuvering within elite circles. Since the petition was signed, some reports indicate that several individuals connected to this petition have faced legal scrutiny, though details remain unclear. President Sadyr Japarov has addressed the removal of Tashiyev, emphasizing the importance of maintaining stability within state institutions and avoiding internal divisions among public servants. “I believe that by making a swift decision, I ensured stability within the system,” Japarov said in earlier remarks, stressing that unity within government structures remains a priority. Separately, there have been discussions in political circles regarding the review of past high-profile legal cases. Former Jogorku Kenesh (parliamentary) deputy Iskhak Masaliev has suggested reassessing certain cases from recent years. One such case involves journalist Makhabat Tazhibek kyzy, whose legal proceedings have attracted significant public attention. In March, the Supreme Court remanded her case for retrial, and her pretrial detention was changed to house arrest. The case is part of a broader investigation involving media professionals detained in January 2024 on charges related to public unrest. Judicial proceedings in these cases remain ongoing. Economic developments have also intersected with recent political discussions. Investigations involving the state company, Kyrgyzneftegaz, have led to the detention of several individuals, including company executives and former officials. The Kyrgyz authorities have stated that these actions are part of broader efforts to ensure transparency and accountability in the management of state assets. Officials from the State Tax Service have addressed the case, noting that new conditions allowed for a comprehensive audit of the company. Subsequent legal actions were taken following the findings. These developments add an economic dimension to the broader political shifts underway. In parallel, Kyrgyzneftegaz has announced a general shareholders’ meeting scheduled for April 16 in Kochkor-Ata. The agenda includes governance changes, amendments to internal documents, and financial restructuring measures. While the authorities continue to emphasize stability and institutional continuity, recent developments have prompted closer scrutiny of how political and administrative changes may shape Kyrgyzstan’s leadership landscape ahead of 2027.
EAEU Trade Frictions Deepen Despite Shymkent Integration Push
The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) met in Shymkent on March 26-27 with a long agenda and a familiar promise: deeper integration, smoother trade, and a more modern common market. Kazakhstan, which holds the bloc’s 2026 chairmanship, used the meeting to push artificial intelligence, digital logistics, industrial cooperation, and the removal of internal barriers. Twelve documents were signed, covering areas including industrial cooperation, transport, and digital integration.
“Kazakhstan aims to become a fully-fledged digital country. We have built a modern ecosystem, including Astana Hub and the Alem.ai AI center, and are ready to share experience with EAEU partners on digital regulation and economic transformation,” Kazakh Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov stated.
That sounds ambitious, but it also highlights the bloc’s central weakness. The EAEU has no shortage of plans; it has a shortage of trust between its members, and that matters more. The dynamics extend across the bloc, but are most visible in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
The EAEU was built to ensure the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor across Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. But the reality keeps drifting away from the treaty. Kazakhstan’s chairmanship agenda calls for a barrier-free internal market, yet the bloc is entering a new phase of tighter controls, retaliatory measures, and disputes over who really benefits.
Shymkent made that contradiction impossible to miss. Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov promoted an AI-based system to coordinate cargo flows across the union and speed up transit. He also backed the full electronic handling of veterinary and phytosanitary checks, all of which are practical ideas. Central Asia needs faster, cheaper, and more predictable logistics, but digital tools do not solve a political problem. A system becomes more efficient only if its members want it to be open. When they want leverage instead, technology can only make the controls smarter.
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Kazakhstan’s priorities already show where the friction lies. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev opened his chairmanship by calling for digital transformation, better transport links, and the elimination of internal trade barriers. He also pushed a stronger external profile for the EAEU, with wider links across Asia, the Arab world, and the Global South. That is a serious agenda for a bloc trying to present itself as a Eurasian logistics hub. That push for external expansion comes at a time when internal frictions are becoming harder to manage. It sits uneasily beside everyday trade practice inside the union, where growing trade disputes have become part of the EAEU’s normal life, not an exception to it.
The clearest recent example is Russia’s SPOT import-control system, which takes effect for road shipments from EAEU countries on April 1. Importers must submit shipment information two days before trucks reach the border and receive a QR code. Moscow has presented the change as a tax-compliance and anti-fraud measure, with additional financial guarantees expected in later phases of its implementation. In practice, it adds cost, time, and uncertainty before goods even reach the border, the opposite of what a customs union is supposed to do. New Russian trade controls are technical on paper, but they change how power works inside the bloc.
The controls already fit into a wider pattern. Border checks and documentation controls have tightened on the Kazakhstan-Russia frontier, and scrutiny of product labeling and paperwork has grown stricter. Businesses now face a system in which “free movement” exists in law, but not in practice. That gap is politically corrosive because it hits the smaller members hardest. Russia can absorb delays and redesign procedures. Kazakhstan also faces rising costs from disruptions, while smaller economies such as Kyrgyzstan feel them more immediately.
Kyrgyzstan has been blunt about that pressure. Earlier this month, Bishkek asked the Eurasian Economic Commission to remove import duties on a group of socially important goods, including flour, vegetable oil, fruits and vegetables, and cocoa powder. The logic was simple: global inflation is still feeding into domestic prices, and smaller members of the bloc need more flexible trade tools than their larger partners. That request made economic sense for Kyrgyzstan, but it also showed how uneven the union remains. When a member needs emergency tariff relief on basic goods to manage price pressure, the common market isn’t functioning on equal terms. Kyrgyzstan’s push for lower import duties came just a week before the Shymkent meeting.
The same imbalance appears in labor. One of the EAEU’s strongest selling points has always been access to the Russian labor market, especially for Kyrgyzstan. That benefit should be real, giving migrants easier legal access to jobs, simpler registration, and better tax regimes. But labor mobility has never been as stable as the bloc’s rhetoric suggests. In January, Kyrgyzstan took Russia to the EAEU court over compulsory medical insurance for migrants’ family members. In March, the court clarified that member states do not have to issue that coverage automatically. The case exposed a basic truth: labor access inside the EAEU is still vulnerable to national limits when politics hardens. Kyrgyzstan’s experience inside the union captures that well.
Kazakhstan has its own reasons to push back more openly. On March 10, Industry and Construction Minister Yersayin Nagaspayev said Kazakhstan would mirror Russia’s higher recycling fee on imported cars as part of efforts to support the domestic industry. That is not the language of seamless integration; it is the language of reciprocal pressure. Once that logic takes hold, the EAEU stops looking like a common market and starts looking like a managed bargaining arena.
None of this means the EAEU is collapsing. Its economic weight is still large, and its members continue to find value in it. Mutual trade in goods has roughly doubled since 2015, reaching close to $100 billion in 2024, according to the Eurasian Economic Commission. In 2024 alone, mutual trade in goods rose by around 9%. The Eurasian Economic Commission says most settlements now take place in national currencies, accounting for over 90% of transactions inside the union. Those are not minor gains. They explain why no member is walking away.
But Shymkent showed where the EAEU stands in 2026. It is good at producing strategies, roadmaps, and digital concepts, but much weaker at guaranteeing that member states will restrain themselves when their interests come first. Kazakhstan’s chairmanship has chosen the right themes: logistics, digitalization, and fewer barriers. The problem is that the union’s real barriers are now political. Until members stop using trade rules, border procedures, and regulatory measures as instruments of pressure, the EAEU will keep modernizing its systems without fixing its core defect. It can integrate its platforms faster than it integrates its interests.
The next intergovernmental meeting is set for Cholpon-Ata, Kyrgyzstan, in early August.
The Iran Conflict Is Stress-Testing Central Asia’s Southern Corridors
Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s proposal of Turkestan city as a venue for Iran-war negotiations shows how directly the conflict had already begun to affect Central Asia itself. The region is no longer simply observing events in Iran. By the time Tokayev made the offer, Central Asian governments were already dealing with evacuations, route disruption, emergency diplomatic coordination, and growing concern over the war’s economic effects. The Iran war has thus become a real test of Central Asia’s southern diversification strategy. Governments across the region have, in recent years, sought to widen access to world markets through Iran, the South Caucasus, and, in some cases, Afghanistan and Pakistan. These channels reduce dependence on northern routes by opening access to Türkiye, Europe, Gulf markets, and the Indian Ocean. The present crisis subjects that strategy to wartime conditions. The strain of war makes it easier to distinguish durable links, conditional ones, and routes that remain more aspirational than real. The C6 and Crisis Coordination The first effects have been practical. Turkmenistan has opened four additional checkpoints along its frontier with Iran, supplementing the Serakhs crossing, while Azerbaijan’s overland route through Astara became another critical outlet, evacuating 312 people from 17 countries between February 28 and March 2. Turkmenistan, according to official reporting, transited more than 200 foreign citizens from 16 countries during the same period. Uzbekistan used the Turkmen route to repatriate its citizens, while Kazakhstan directed its nationals toward overland exits through Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Türkiye. The war is already affecting borders, consular work, and the regional diplomatic agenda. This immediate response gives sharper political meaning to the widening of the Central Asian C5 into a C6 with Azerbaijan. The March 2 call among the five Central Asian foreign ministers and Azerbaijan showed that the format was already there to be used under pressure. What had until now appeared mainly as a corridor framework shaped by summit diplomacy and expert work appeared instead as a working format for crisis coordination linking Central Asia to the South Caucasus. The C6 idea is becoming more practical and more overtly diplomatic. The Organization of Turkic States adds a second, broader layer. Its foreign ministers met in Istanbul on March 7 and issued a joint statement expressing concern over the escalation in the Middle East, condemning actions that endanger civilians, warning against further regional destabilization, and affirming that threats to the security and interests of member states concern the organization as a whole. The statement was cautious, and the OTS is not turning into a military instrument. Even so, the war is testing whether a Turkic political space extending from Turkey through the South Caucasus to Central Asia can do more than express concern as regional security deteriorates. The C6 is becoming a working format for immediate coordination, while the OTS remains the broader political frame within which that coordination takes on institutional meaning. Corridor Stress and Resilience The trans-Iran transit option offers Central Asia a continuous land arc from regional railheads and road networks onward to Türkiye and connected European systems, with the further possibility of reaching southern ports on the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf. Under ordinary conditions, that continuity is its main advantage over routes that require repeated port and rail transfers: it reduces transshipment points, shortens the route in practice, and can make timing more predictable. Under wartime conditions, however, the same corridor is exposed to airspace closures, border disruption, sanctions complications, financing friction, insurance risk, and broader political uncertainty. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or Middle Corridor, avoids Iran-linked routes and instead depends on a more segmented chain. It relies on port capacity, scheduling, and political stability across a wider set of nodes: rail or road to Caspian shipping ports such as Aktau or Kuryk, sea passage across the Caspian, and stable conditions in the South Caucasus to keep traffic moving on time through Azerbaijan and Georgia toward Türkiye and Europe. Tehran’s March 5 drone strike on Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave, one of the most serious recent incidents in bilateral relations, showed how directly the conflict could affect the Middle Corridor. Uzbekistan complicates the picture because alternatives through Afghanistan and Pakistan toward the Arabian Sea and Gulf markets pass through it. Uzbekistan is not just a single-corridor user. It is one of the main gateways for several southward routes at once: west-southwest through Turkmenistan and Iran, south through Afghanistan toward Pakistani ports, and east-west through projects linking China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan more closely to downstream routes. None of these options can simply substitute for another, and none escapes the wider instability to the south. Current conditions cast doubt on all of them. The war is testing not just routes through Iran but the broader logic of southward diversification. Second-order Stress Transmission The same pressure is now visible in the skies. Europe-Asia flight patterns have already shifted as carriers avoid Iranian and other risky airspace. TCA reported that Central Asia’s airspace has value not as a substitute for Gulf hubs but in a narrower, more practical sense, as overflight space when southern corridors become harder to use. The European Union Aviation Safety Agency has meanwhile kept in force a conflict-zone bulletin warning operators about Iranian and neighboring airspace. Disruption in the usual geometry of Europe-Asia air traffic increases the importance of Central Asia’s skies. TCA also noted early in the crisis that a wider conflict could reverberate across Central Asia through rising energy prices and pressure on major transport corridors. Spillover from the Iran war affects not only routes that stop functioning. It also forces airlines onto longer routes with higher fuel costs, alters shipping and insurance calculations, and raises logistics costs more generally. The cost, timing, and insurability of goods movement to and through landlocked Central Asia already depend on long-distance logistics. Changes here channel the effects of a distant war into domestic economies. Turkmenistan offers the clearest early sign of how fast an Iranian supply shock can spread across Central Asia. Retailers and consumers in Ashgabat have told Reuters that prices for key goods imported from Iran have risen sharply because cross-border trade has slowed. Kyrgyzstan has also seen direct disruption of logistics, forcing importers and logistics firms to seek alternative arrangements, as freight forwarders told TCA that cargo transit through Iran had effectively stopped. These are concrete examples of how the war’s shocks are spreading through Central Asia. The broader regional question is how far such pressures extend into Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan through fuel, shipping, construction inputs, consumer goods, and supply costs more generally. Implications for the Caspian Region and Beyond The conflict’s movement toward the Caspian Sea littoral broadens the stakes. Israeli strikes on Iranian naval targets in the Caspian brought the war into a maritime zone relevant to regional energy and transit flows. The issue is no longer limited to Gulf shipping or borderland evacuation. It now reaches into a maritime-energy space central to Central Asian economic security and wider Eurasian connectivity. For Central Asia, the immediate question is where resilience must now be strengthened: in evacuation coordination, alternative routes, transport-risk management, and protection against import shocks. The deeper question concerns regional agency. The current shock exposes logistical weak points. It could strengthen corridor diversification, but only if the region finds ways to act on those weaknesses rather than merely react to them. The wider Eurasian significance extends beyond Central Asia. China has an interest in containing instability to preserve reliable westward and southward corridors. Greater instability around the Caspian is not in Moscow’s interest, even if Russia may benefit when southern alternatives weaken. The European Union has a clear stake in resilient non-Russian connectivity across the Caspian and South Caucasus, not least because many of its current assumptions about Eurasian connectivity depend on those corridors functioning with reasonable predictability. The United States, for its part, has an interest in regional stability and in preventing Central Asia’s room for maneuver from narrowing under the pressure of war. The deeper question is whether Central Asia can remain connected on terms that preserve strategic flexibility across Eurasia in a more sharply divided order.
Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team examine a series of major developments across Central Asia, from the results of Kazakhstan's constitutional referendum to the announcement of new Chinese-funded border outposts and fortifications along Tajikistan's frontier. We also look at the continuing fallout from the security shake-up in Kyrgyzstan, with further arrests and resignations, as well as the increasingly strange foreign movements of Turkmenistan's senior leadership while war continues to rage just across the border in Iran, alongside Tehran's threats to strike Turkmen infrastructure. The episode then turns to the escalating conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan, where some of the heaviest fighting in months is raising fresh questions about border stability, regional security, and the risk of wider spillover. Finally, for our main story, we bring on a panel of experts to discuss the growing issues surrounding the Rogun Dam and its resettlement project, and how both are likely to affect the states downstream. On the show this week: - Eugene Simonov (Rivers Without Boundaries Coalition) - Mark Fodor (Coalition for Human Rights in Development)
Caspian Escalation Raises Stakes for Central Asia
Central Asia, which has increasingly sought to present itself as a coordinated actor on the global political stage, has until recently maintained a cautious, non-aligned stance regarding the escalation in the Middle East. However, attacks affecting infrastructure in the Caspian region have altered the diplomatic balance. The Caspian Sea is a critical transit zone for Central Asia, linking Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan and onward to European and Middle Eastern markets. It forms part of key east–west and north–south trade corridors that have gained importance since Russia’s war in Ukraine disrupted traditional transit routes. In recent years, regional dynamics have also been shaped by Azerbaijan’s growing engagement with Central Asian states, including its formal inclusion in the expanded Central Asian consultative format, which has effectively evolved from the C5 into the C6. Baku has played an important role in regional connectivity. It has developed close relations with both Turkey and Israel, factors that influence geopolitical calculations in the Caspian basin, which directly borders Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. This growing alignment has reinforced efforts to develop the Middle Corridor across the Caspian, linking Central Asia to Europe via the South Caucasus. Turkey maintains political, economic, and cultural influence in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan through the Organization of Turkic States. Russian political discourse has at times portrayed this cooperation as part of a broader pan-Turkic geopolitical project, a characterization widely dismissed by officials and analysts in Central Asia. Nevertheless, Astana and Baku continue to maintain strong relations with Ankara, a development that has periodically caused concern in Moscow. Under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kazakhstan has also strengthened ties with Gulf states. Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia have become significant investors in the country’s economy. In this context, Iranian attacks on Gulf states not directly involved in the conflict have shaped Astana’s diplomatic positioning during the current crisis. Reports of drone attacks widely blamed on Iran targeting the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan have further heightened regional tensions. At the initial stage of the escalation, Kazakhstan’s response was largely limited to diplomatic contacts with regional leaders. At the same time, several Central Asian countries, along with Azerbaijan, expressed concern over the humanitarian consequences of the conflict and began dispatching aid to Iran. Azerbaijan sent nearly 30 tons of food and medical supplies on March 10, followed by another 82 tons of humanitarian aid on March 18. Uzbekistan delivered approximately 120 tons of humanitarian supplies, including flour, vegetable oil, sugar, and canned food, according to regional media reports. Turkmenistan also sent humanitarian aid consisting of medicines, medical supplies, and other goods, primarily intended for children. The Tajik government reported sending a convoy of 110 heavy trucks carrying humanitarian cargo to Iran, with a total weight of 3,610 tons. The diplomatic environment shifted further after Israeli air strikes on March 18 targeting Iranian naval facilities in the Caspian Sea. According to Israeli military statements cited by international media, the targets included a major port of the Iranian Navy, where, reportedly, "dozens of ships were destroyed,” as well as “the central command post of the Iranian Navy and infrastructure used for the repair and maintenance of Iranian military vessels.” The basin is also central to regional energy flows, with offshore infrastructure, shipping routes, and pipeline-linked export systems connecting Caspian producers to global markets. Any expansion of conflict into this space raises risks for both energy exports and maritime transport. Security in the Caspian basin is a shared concern for both littoral states and their regional partners. According to analyst Denis Borisov, Iran’s Caspian transport infrastructure forms part of regional corridors used by Central Asian states, making stability in the basin strategically important. Kazakhstan, one of the five Caspian littoral states, began actively signaling support for de-escalation shortly after the strikes. On March 21, speaking in the Turkestan region, President Tokayev called for an end to attacks on civilian and economic targets and urged parties to engage in negotiations. He reiterated Kazakhstan’s readiness to host potential peace talks. On March 22, the presidents of Kazakhstan and Iran exchanged congratulatory messages on the occasion of Eid al-Fitr and Nauryz. Tokayev expressed hopes for strengthened unity and stability in the Middle East. Diplomatic contacts intensified on March 23, when Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov held a telephone conversation with his Iranian counterpart Seyed Abbas Araghchi to discuss regional developments and possible steps toward reducing military tensions, including the need to maintain security in the Caspian region. On the same day, Turkmenistan’s Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov also spoke with Araghchi. Iranian readouts of the call warned that recent strikes could have security and environmental consequences for the Caspian Sea. Also on March 23, Tokayev received the United Arab Emirates Ambassador to Kazakhstan, Mohammed Said Mohammed al-Ariqi. During the meeting, Tokayev expressed concern over Iranian bombardments targeting the UAE, reiterated Kazakhstan’s opposition to involving neutral states in the conflict, and once again offered Kazakhstan as a platform for peace talks. The escalation affecting the Caspian region has therefore acted as a catalyst for intensified diplomatic engagement by Central Asian states and Azerbaijan aimed at steering the crisis toward dialogue. As Tokayev has suggested, such efforts may prove critical before the window for negotiated solutions narrows. As the conflict edges closer to key transit and energy routes, the stakes for Central Asia are no longer peripheral, but immediate.
Kyrgyzstan Prioritizes Export Support as External Trade Declines
Kyrgyzstan is intensifying efforts to support domestic exporters as the country faces a sustained decline in foreign trade. Authorities now regard export development as a central pillar of economic policy. First Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Daniyar Amangeldiyev reiterated this position during a meeting of the Export Development Council on March 24. The government is considering a range of practical measures aimed at strengthening export capacity. Among them is a pilot programme to partially reimburse transportation and logistics costs. The initiative is intended to reduce the price of Kyrgyz goods in foreign markets and enhance their competitiveness. At the same time, officials plan to expand access to financing through a new preferential credit facility titled “Export Contract Financing.” The mechanism is designed to address exporters’ cash-flow constraints and support working capital, backed by insurance instruments and state guarantees. These steps come amid a significant deterioration in trade performance. According to the National Statistical Committee, Kyrgyzstan’s exports fell by 20.3% in January 2026, while imports increased by 6.1%. The decline reflects a broader trend. In 2025, exports dropped by 44.5%, while imports rose by 3.9%. Total foreign trade turnover reached $15.8 billion, representing a decrease of 10.2% compared to 2024. Kyrgyzstan’s export geography remains relatively concentrated. In 2025, the country’s main export destinations were Russia (22.9%), Kazakhstan (15.9%), Switzerland (15.4%), Uzbekistan (14.2%), and the United Kingdom (8.2%). Imports, meanwhile, were dominated by China (37.2%), followed by Russia (24.6%) and Kazakhstan (10.9%). Such concentration increases the economy’s vulnerability to fluctuations in demand among a limited number of trading partners. The sharp fall in exports was driven largely by declining gold shipments, Kyrgyzstan’s principal export commodity. According to the Ministry of Economy, gold exports fell by a factor of 3.7 in 2025. Gold accounted for 23.9% of total exports, underscoring the country’s dependence on a single commodity. Both external and domestic factors contributed to the downturn. Weaker demand in key partner markets, including Russia and Kazakhstan, reduced export volumes. At the same time, temporary government restrictions on the export of certain goods, such as scrap metal and livestock, also constrained trade flows.
Kyrgyzstan Braces for Showdown Between President Japarov and Former Security Chief Tashiyev
When Kyrgyzstan’s President Sadyr Japarov suddenly dismissed his long-time friend Kamchybek Tashiyev as head of the country’s State Committee for National Security (GKNB) on February 10, he cryptically said it was “in the interests of our state, in order to prevent a split in society.” Less than two months later, that split could be coming, and there is a possibility the country is headed for a confrontation between the two men and their supporters. The Gathering Clouds Tashiyev returned to Kyrgyzstan on March 19 after being outside the country for more than a month amid a widening corruption investigation targeting Tashiyev and people close to him. On the day he arrived, Tashiyev went to the Interior Ministry’s investigative department, where he was questioned about state-owned company Kyrgyzneftegaz. On March 17, the head of the State Tax Service, Almambet Shykmamatov, said that “Kyrgyzneftegaz was under the complete control of the GKNB.” The State Tax Service is looking into allegations that Kyrgyzneftegaz sold crude oil to private companies connected to Tashiyev’s relatives or associates who then sold the oil back to Kyrgyzneftegaz at a profit. These accusations are not new. Bolot Temirov, the host of the investigative news program Temirov Live, reported about this exact topic in January 2022. Two days after the report was posted on YouTube, police raided the office of Temirov Live, detaining Temirov on narcotics possession charges that were later dropped. Instead, Temirov was convicted of having a fake Kyrgyz passport and using false documents to cross in and out of Kyrgyzstan. At an appeals trial in November 2022, a judge ordered Temirov deported from Kyrgyzstan, and he was taken from the courtroom to the airport and put on a plane to Russia. Several journalists connected to Temirov Live have been detained, and some, including Temirov’s wife, have been imprisoned since Temirov’s expulsion from Kyrgyzstan. The State Tax Service has resurrected the Temirov Live accusations, while insisting that the evidence it collected has no relationship to the Temirov Live report. Tashiyev’s nephew, Baigazy Matisakov, who was the head of the Kyrgyzneftegaz refinery since 2021, was detained on March 18. Tashiyev’s son, Tay-Muras, who is connected to Moko Group, one of the private companies involved in purchasing oil from and then reselling it to Kyrgyzneftegaz, was questioned at the Interior Ministry. An article from March 16 states that the State Tax Service also connected Tashiyev’s brother, Shairbek, to illegal activities in the oil business. Reports about Tashiyev being questioned at the Interior Ministry on March 19 stressed that he was called in as a “witness.” Japarov Goes on the Offensive On February 10, the reason for sacking Tashiyev, who was out of the country at the time, was unclear. In the days that followed, it gradually became apparent that this was more than just a disagreement between two friends who had governed Kyrgyzstan together for five years. Japarov also dismissed top officials in the GKNB, which Tashiyev had headed since October 2020. Officials in the Interior Ministry, the prosecutor general’s office, several ministers, the mayors of Kyrgyzstan’s second and third largest cities, Osh and Manas (formerly Jalal-Abad), respectively, and eight newly-elected members of parliament were fired or suddenly resigned. Tashiyev’s brother, Shairbek, received some 56% of the votes in his district in the November 30, 2025, parliamentary elections, the biggest percentage received by any candidate in the 30 electoral districts. On February 16, less than a week after his brother was fired as head of the GKNB, Shairbek said his brother’s dismissal “did not cause a stir in our family.” He commented about posts on social networks that were calling for him to step down, saying that only the people who voted for him had the right to take away his deputy’s mandate. But on March 13, the Interior Ministry’s Investigative Department called Shairbek in for questioning, and the next day, he signed a declaration officially relinquishing his seat in parliament. The Border Guard Service was subordinate to the GKNB, but Japarov transferred it under the control of the president’s office, and also created a state security service and an investigative committee that report directly to the president. All the while, Japarov insisted he and Tashiyev were still friends. Shortly after Tashiyev was dismissed, the head of the presidential press service, Dayyrbek Orunbekov, warned there was a fake campaign to discredit Tashiyev, and later, Syrgak Berdikozhoyev, the chairman of the newly created State Security Service, stated that Tashiyev would continue to receive government security. An Ominous Silence Tashiyev was in Germany when Japarov announced his dismissal. Japarov said he had spoken with Tashiyev before the announcement, but Tashiyev said the move was unexpected. The apparent reason for firing Tashiyev was an appeal a group of 75 former government officials and prominent public figures released on February 9, calling for President Japarov and then-speaker of parliament Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu to set a date for an early presidential election. Japarov was elected president in January 2021 under a previous constitution that stipulated a six-year term for the president. A new constitution approved in a national referendum in April 2021 reduced the presidential term to five years, so there was some ambiguity about Japarov’s time in office. Hours after the appeal was made public, information appeared claiming that some of its authors were contacting members of parliament and other people, and urging them to “go over to the general’s (Tashiyev’s) side” when an early presidential election was held. The timing was strange. Tashiyev departed Kyrgyzstan on February 6 for a medical check-up in Germany, something he has done regularly since undergoing heart surgery there in February 2021. He returned on February 13 and met briefly with Japarov on February 15, then left Kyrgyzstan again on February 17. Tashiyev did not make any comments to the media during his short stay in Kyrgyzstan. After the meeting, President Japarov said Tashiyev would not be returning to any government position and hinted that perhaps the discussion had not gone well. “Of course, he (Tashiyev) won't say thank you now; he'll be upset,” Japarov said, adding, “But years from now, he'll say, ‘Friend, you did the right thing back then.’” Tashiyev remained in Kyrgyzstan after being questioned by the Interior Ministry, and on March 20, attended prayers in Bishkek marking the end of Ramadan. “If I made a mistake and offended anyone, I ask for forgiveness,” he told the media. But, he added, “I have forgiven everyone who spread rumors and slandered during the holy month… I hope next time they won't do this and spread information that is not true.” Next Move? Most of the people in government whom Japarov has sacked since February 10 are connected to Tashiyev. The investigation involving Kyrgyzneftegaz seems to be the next step in disassembling Tashiyev’s support base, but this is a dangerous move. While there is almost surely “kompromat” on Tashiyev and his family, the same is true of Japarov. One example is Japarov’s sister, Raykul, who fled Kyrgyzstan in 2014 just before she was convicted of laundering illegal proceeds and sentenced to seven years in prison. In 2015, she was convicted of involvement in the 2007 illegal takeover of Investbank Issyk-Kul and was sentenced to ten years in prison. Raykul Japarova has repeatedly denied any wrongdoing. A warrant was issued for her arrest, and as of May 2020, she was reportedly seeking political asylum in Poland. Then came the October 2020 revolution in Kyrgyzstan. Sadyr Japarov was in prison, three years into an 11.5-year sentence for kidnapping a local official during protests in Issyk-Kul in October 2013, charges which Japarov denies. Sadyr Japarov initially fled Kyrgyzstan, but was arrested and convicted after returning in March 2017. Japarov was freed from prison by supporters during the October 2020 revolution and, with help from Tashiyev and others, was catapulted into the presidency in less than two weeks. In January 2021, Kyrgyzstan’s Supreme Court overturned the convictions of Raykul Japarova. The Supreme Court had already overturned Japarov’s conviction shortly after he was freed from prison in October 2020. There are more recent allegations that members of Japarov’s family and their friends have also been involved in unethical or illegal business activities. As head of Kyrgyzstan’s security service for more than five years, Tashiyev probably has his own kompromat material on the Japarov family and their acquaintances. Loyal supporters of Japarov and Tashiyev are likely on edge already and preparing for a potentially volatile period in the coming weeks.
Sunkar Podcast
Central Asia and the Troubled Southern Route
