Fuel prices

Central Asia Avoids Fuel Shock as Global Pressures Build

Central Asia has so far avoided the immediate fuel shocks spreading across much of the world following the U.S. and Israel’s war with Iran. There are no lines at gas stations, no visible shortages, and no signs of panic buying. But that stability sits within a rapidly tightening global market, where disruptions in Asia and policy responses in Europe are reshaping fuel flows in ways the region will struggle to avoid.

Across Southeast Asia, governments are already taking precautionary steps. Some state agencies and private firms are shifting parts of their workforce to remote work to reduce fuel consumption and prepare for potential price spikes and logistics disruptions, while Thailand is preparing contingency measures, including possible fuel rationing.

China, one of Asia’s largest suppliers of refined fuels, has moved to restrict exports of gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel in an effort to prevent domestic shortages linked to the war. The move is expected to tighten supplies across Asia, especially for countries that rely on Chinese fuel imports. China supplied about one-third of Australia’s jet fuel last year, highlighting the wider regional impact, and roughly half of the Philippines’ and Bangladesh’s in 2024. Vietnam has already warned airlines to prepare for flight reductions in April due to the risk of shortages caused by these export restrictions. Indonesia is also imposing limits on fuel sales.  Fuel-related pressures have begun to emerge in Europe as well. Poland has introduced tax measures aimed at reducing fuel prices, with the government saying this will lower prices for consumers. Slovenia, meanwhile, has introduced significant restrictions on fuel consumption. Under new rules, private motorists are limited to purchasing a maximum of 50 liters per day, while businesses and farmers may purchase up to 200 liters daily. The combined effect of war-driven energy shocks and renewed tariff barriers is raising global costs and adding pressure across trade, transport, and inflation. Against this backdrop, Central Asia’s apparent stability is misleading. It is highly unlikely that import-dependent states such as Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan will be as well protected as Kazakhstan, which may benefit in the short term from higher crude prices. Starting April 1, Russia is banning gasoline exports in an effort to stabilize its own domestic market. Russia is a key fuel supplier to Central Asia. However, according to assurances from the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, the temporary export ban will not affect supplies to Uzbekistan. Deliveries under intergovernmental agreements are expected to continue, ensuring that at least part of the region’s supply remains uninterrupted. In Kyrgyzstan, despite recent developments, fuel prices and supplies remain relatively stable. The government is considering lowering taxes or temporarily waiving excise duties for fuel importers should the crisis continue. Information from Turkmenistan is difficult to verify independently. Despite reports of fuel shortages at gas stations last year, official media are now indicating a significant increase in domestic gasoline production. The production plan for January-February 2026 was reportedly fulfilled at 122.7%, according to Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Guvancha Agajanov, speaking at a recent government meeting. Kazakhstan occupies a special position due to its substantial reserves of key mineral resources. Currently, there appear to be no major supply issues, even amid emerging global pressures. However, underlying challenges are becoming more apparent. As of March 23, 2026, data from GlobalPetrolPrices places Kazakhstan among the countries with some of the lowest gasoline prices. This group includes Libya, Iran, Venezuela, Angola, Kuwait, Algeria, Turkmenistan, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Oman. In these countries, fuel prices, ranging from $0.34 to $0.70 per liter, are shaped either by abundant natural resources or strong state intervention. Kazakhstan follows a similar model, combining domestic resource availability with government regulation. The country maintains a moratorium on price increases for the most in-demand fuel grades. However, according to Kazakhstani expert Olzhas Baideldinov, wholesale prices for petroleum products have risen by 17%. Rail transport costs have increased significantly (+72%), along with other expenses. As a result, gas stations are reportedly operating at a loss when selling gasoline and diesel. This suggests that Kazakhstan’s domestic fuel market requires substantial adjustment. For comparison, gasoline prices (per liter), according to GlobalPetrolPrices, currently stand at: U.S. - $1.133; Azerbaijan - $0.676; Kazakhstan - $0.507; Kyrgyzstan - $0.917; Turkmenistan - $0.428; and Uzbekistan - $1.077. Tajikistan stands apart, with gasoline prices above $1.10 per liter, the highest in Central Asia, reflecting its heavy dependence on imported fuel. These figures reflect a mix of domestic resources and state controls that continue to shield local markets from global price pressures. The region's exposure is not immediate, but it is structural.

Central Asia’s energy security is not just about supply, but also about routes. The region remains heavily dependent on external refining systems and transport corridors that are now under pressure, whether through Russia, the Caspian, or southern routes linked to the Persian Gulf. Disruptions far beyond the region are therefore quickly transmitted into local markets.

For now, Central Asia looks insulated. But in a tightening system, insulation is often temporary.

Tourism

Turkmenistan Promotes Tourism Abroad — While Keeping Its Borders Closed

Turkmen authorities are preparing to host an international tourism forum, once again emphasizing the sector’s potential. However, the reality appears less optimistic. The number of foreign visitors remains extremely low, while a strict visa regime continues to deter not only tourists but also business travellers. The Turkmen Travel international forum and exhibition is scheduled to take place in Ashgabat from April 14 to 16. Preparations are reportedly being carried out at a high level. Deputy Prime Minister for Culture, Bahar Seydova, briefed officials on the event, and President Serdar Berdimuhamedov has instructed organizers to present the country’s tourism potential in a dignified manner. At the same time, a paradoxical situation has emerged. Despite the construction of modern hotels in Ashgabat and the Avaza tourist zone, the opening of new airports, and the hosting of international events, foreign tourists visit Turkmenistan extremely rarely. Even travellers with a genuine interest in the country frequently encounter significant visa restrictions. According to sources, these challenges affect not only tourists. Representatives of international companies also face lengthy and complicated entry procedures. Market participants note that interest in Turkmenistan does exist. A representative of a travel agency in Ashgabat said that combined tours of Central Asia remain popular among tourists from China, the U.S., European countries, Australia, South America, and Russia. By 2024, demand for trips to Turkmenistan had increased by about 50% compared with the 2018-2020 period. Nevertheless, actual visitor numbers remain very low. Strict entry rules are also affecting business activity. For example, in February 2024, specialists from South Korea’s Hyundai Engineering were unable to arrive in Turkmenistan on time to carry out restoration work at the polymer plant in Kiyanly following an accident. Their visas were delayed due to bureaucratic procedures. Such cases are reported to occur regularly. While the state is seeking to attract foreign companies to major projects, it often fails to provide basic conditions for their operations. Against this backdrop, calls to reconsider current policies are becoming more frequent. Without a more open approach, Turkmenistan may struggle not only to increase tourist arrivals but also to support broader economic development.

Southern Corridor

The Iran Conflict Is Stress-Testing Central Asia’s Southern Corridors

Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s proposal of Turkestan city as a venue for Iran-war negotiations shows how directly the conflict had already begun to affect Central Asia itself. The region is no longer simply observing events in Iran. By the time Tokayev made the offer, Central Asian governments were already dealing with evacuations, route disruption, emergency diplomatic coordination, and growing concern over the war’s economic effects. The Iran war has thus become a real test of Central Asia’s southern diversification strategy. Governments across the region have, in recent years, sought to widen access to world markets through Iran, the South Caucasus, and, in some cases, Afghanistan and Pakistan. These channels reduce dependence on northern routes by opening access to Türkiye, Europe, Gulf markets, and the Indian Ocean. The present crisis subjects that strategy to wartime conditions. The strain of war makes it easier to distinguish durable links, conditional ones, and routes that remain more aspirational than real. The C6 and Crisis Coordination The first effects have been practical. Turkmenistan has opened four additional checkpoints along its frontier with Iran, supplementing the Serakhs crossing, while Azerbaijan’s overland route through Astara became another critical outlet, evacuating 312 people from 17 countries between February 28 and March 2. Turkmenistan, according to official reporting, transited more than 200 foreign citizens from 16 countries during the same period. Uzbekistan used the Turkmen route to repatriate its citizens, while Kazakhstan directed its nationals toward overland exits through Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Türkiye. The war is already affecting borders, consular work, and the regional diplomatic agenda. This immediate response gives sharper political meaning to the widening of the Central Asian C5 into a C6 with Azerbaijan. The March 2 call among the five Central Asian foreign ministers and Azerbaijan showed that the format was already there to be used under pressure. What had until now appeared mainly as a corridor framework shaped by summit diplomacy and expert work appeared instead as a working format for crisis coordination linking Central Asia to the South Caucasus. The C6 idea is becoming more practical and more overtly diplomatic. The Organization of Turkic States adds a second, broader layer. Its foreign ministers met in Istanbul on March 7 and issued a joint statement expressing concern over the escalation in the Middle East, condemning actions that endanger civilians, warning against further regional destabilization, and affirming that threats to the security and interests of member states concern the organization as a whole. The statement was cautious, and the OTS is not turning into a military instrument. Even so, the war is testing whether a Turkic political space extending from Turkey through the South Caucasus to Central Asia can do more than express concern as regional security deteriorates. The C6 is becoming a working format for immediate coordination, while the OTS remains the broader political frame within which that coordination takes on institutional meaning. Corridor Stress and Resilience The trans-Iran transit option offers Central Asia a continuous land arc from regional railheads and road networks onward to Türkiye and connected European systems, with the further possibility of reaching southern ports on the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf. Under ordinary conditions, that continuity is its main advantage over routes that require repeated port and rail transfers: it reduces transshipment points, shortens the route in practice, and can make timing more predictable. Under wartime conditions, however, the same corridor is exposed to airspace closures, border disruption, sanctions complications, financing friction, insurance risk, and broader political uncertainty. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or Middle Corridor, avoids Iran-linked routes and instead depends on a more segmented chain. It relies on port capacity, scheduling, and political stability across a wider set of nodes: rail or road to Caspian shipping ports such as Aktau or Kuryk, sea passage across the Caspian, and stable conditions in the South Caucasus to keep traffic moving on time through Azerbaijan and Georgia toward Türkiye and Europe. Tehran’s March 5 drone strike on Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave, one of the most serious recent incidents in bilateral relations, showed how directly the conflict could affect the Middle Corridor. Uzbekistan complicates the picture because alternatives through Afghanistan and Pakistan toward the Arabian Sea and Gulf markets pass through it. Uzbekistan is not just a single-corridor user. It is one of the main gateways for several southward routes at once: west-southwest through Turkmenistan and Iran, south through Afghanistan toward Pakistani ports, and east-west through projects linking China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan more closely to downstream routes. None of these options can simply substitute for another, and none escapes the wider instability to the south. Current conditions cast doubt on all of them. The war is testing not just routes through Iran but the broader logic of southward diversification. Second-order Stress Transmission The same pressure is now visible in the skies. Europe-Asia flight patterns have already shifted as carriers avoid Iranian and other risky airspace. TCA reported that Central Asia’s airspace has value not as a substitute for Gulf hubs but in a narrower, more practical sense, as overflight space when southern corridors become harder to use. The European Union Aviation Safety Agency has meanwhile kept in force a conflict-zone bulletin warning operators about Iranian and neighboring airspace. Disruption in the usual geometry of Europe-Asia air traffic increases the importance of Central Asia’s skies. TCA also noted early in the crisis that a wider conflict could reverberate across Central Asia through rising energy prices and pressure on major transport corridors. Spillover from the Iran war affects not only routes that stop functioning. It also forces airlines onto longer routes with higher fuel costs, alters shipping and insurance calculations, and raises logistics costs more generally. The cost, timing, and insurability of goods movement to and through landlocked Central Asia already depend on long-distance logistics. Changes here channel the effects of a distant war into domestic economies. Turkmenistan offers the clearest early sign of how fast an Iranian supply shock can spread across Central Asia. Retailers and consumers in Ashgabat have told Reuters that prices for key goods imported from Iran have risen sharply because cross-border trade has slowed. Kyrgyzstan has also seen direct disruption of logistics, forcing importers and logistics firms to seek alternative arrangements, as freight forwarders told TCA that cargo transit through Iran had effectively stopped. These are concrete examples of how the war’s shocks are spreading through Central Asia. The broader regional question is how far such pressures extend into Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan through fuel, shipping, construction inputs, consumer goods, and supply costs more generally. Implications for the Caspian Region and Beyond The conflict’s movement toward the Caspian Sea littoral broadens the stakes. Israeli strikes on Iranian naval targets in the Caspian brought the war into a maritime zone relevant to regional energy and transit flows. The issue is no longer limited to Gulf shipping or borderland evacuation. It now reaches into a maritime-energy space central to Central Asian economic security and wider Eurasian connectivity. For Central Asia, the immediate question is where resilience must now be strengthened: in evacuation coordination, alternative routes, transport-risk management, and protection against import shocks. The deeper question concerns regional agency. The current shock exposes logistical weak points. It could strengthen corridor diversification, but only if the region finds ways to act on those weaknesses rather than merely react to them. The wider Eurasian significance extends beyond Central Asia. China has an interest in containing instability to preserve reliable westward and southward corridors. Greater instability around the Caspian is not in Moscow’s interest, even if Russia may benefit when southern alternatives weaken. The European Union has a clear stake in resilient non-Russian connectivity across the Caspian and South Caucasus, not least because many of its current assumptions about Eurasian connectivity depend on those corridors functioning with reasonable predictability. The United States, for its part, has an interest in regional stability and in preventing Central Asia’s room for maneuver from narrowing under the pressure of war. The deeper question is whether Central Asia can remain connected on terms that preserve strategic flexibility across Eurasia in a more sharply divided order.

Podcast

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team examine a series of major developments across Central Asia, from the results of Kazakhstan's constitutional referendum to the announcement of new Chinese-funded border outposts and fortifications along Tajikistan's frontier. We also look at the continuing fallout from the security shake-up in Kyrgyzstan, with further arrests and resignations, as well as the increasingly strange foreign movements of Turkmenistan's senior leadership while war continues to rage just across the border in Iran, alongside Tehran's threats to strike Turkmen infrastructure. The episode then turns to the escalating conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan, where some of the heaviest fighting in months is raising fresh questions about border stability, regional security, and the risk of wider spillover. Finally, for our main story, we bring on a panel of experts to discuss the growing issues surrounding the Rogun Dam and its resettlement project, and how both are likely to affect the states downstream. On the show this week: - Eugene Simonov (Rivers Without Boundaries Coalition) - Mark Fodor (Coalition for Human Rights in Development)

Caspian

Caspian Escalation Raises Stakes for Central Asia

Central Asia, which has increasingly sought to present itself as a coordinated actor on the global political stage, has until recently maintained a cautious, non-aligned stance regarding the escalation in the Middle East. However, attacks affecting infrastructure in the Caspian region have altered the diplomatic balance. The Caspian Sea is a critical transit zone for Central Asia, linking Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan and onward to European and Middle Eastern markets. It forms part of key east–west and north–south trade corridors that have gained importance since Russia’s war in Ukraine disrupted traditional transit routes. In recent years, regional dynamics have also been shaped by Azerbaijan’s growing engagement with Central Asian states, including its formal inclusion in the expanded Central Asian consultative format, which has effectively evolved from the C5 into the C6. Baku has played an important role in regional connectivity. It has developed close relations with both Turkey and Israel, factors that influence geopolitical calculations in the Caspian basin, which directly borders Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. This growing alignment has reinforced efforts to develop the Middle Corridor across the Caspian, linking Central Asia to Europe via the South Caucasus. Turkey maintains political, economic, and cultural influence in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan through the Organization of Turkic States. Russian political discourse has at times portrayed this cooperation as part of a broader pan-Turkic geopolitical project, a characterization widely dismissed by officials and analysts in Central Asia. Nevertheless, Astana and Baku continue to maintain strong relations with Ankara, a development that has periodically caused concern in Moscow. Under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kazakhstan has also strengthened ties with Gulf states. Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia have become significant investors in the country’s economy. In this context, Iranian attacks on Gulf states not directly involved in the conflict have shaped Astana’s diplomatic positioning during the current crisis. Reports of drone attacks widely blamed on Iran targeting the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan have further heightened regional tensions. At the initial stage of the escalation, Kazakhstan’s response was largely limited to diplomatic contacts with regional leaders. At the same time, several Central Asian countries, along with Azerbaijan, expressed concern over the humanitarian consequences of the conflict and began dispatching aid to Iran. Azerbaijan sent nearly 30 tons of food and medical supplies on March 10, followed by another 82 tons of humanitarian aid on March 18. Uzbekistan delivered approximately 120 tons of humanitarian supplies, including flour, vegetable oil, sugar, and canned food, according to regional media reports. Turkmenistan also sent humanitarian aid consisting of medicines, medical supplies, and other goods, primarily intended for children. The Tajik government reported sending a convoy of 110 heavy trucks carrying humanitarian cargo to Iran, with a total weight of 3,610 tons. The diplomatic environment shifted further after Israeli air strikes on March 18 targeting Iranian naval facilities in the Caspian Sea. According to Israeli military statements cited by international media, the targets included a major port of the Iranian Navy, where, reportedly, "dozens of ships were destroyed,” as well as “the central command post of the Iranian Navy and infrastructure used for the repair and maintenance of Iranian military vessels.” The basin is also central to regional energy flows, with offshore infrastructure, shipping routes, and pipeline-linked export systems connecting Caspian producers to global markets. Any expansion of conflict into this space raises risks for both energy exports and maritime transport. Security in the Caspian basin is a shared concern for both littoral states and their regional partners. According to analyst Denis Borisov, Iran’s Caspian transport infrastructure forms part of regional corridors used by Central Asian states, making stability in the basin strategically important. Kazakhstan, one of the five Caspian littoral states, began actively signaling support for de-escalation shortly after the strikes. On March 21, speaking in the Turkestan region, President Tokayev called for an end to attacks on civilian and economic targets and urged parties to engage in negotiations. He reiterated Kazakhstan’s readiness to host potential peace talks. On March 22, the presidents of Kazakhstan and Iran exchanged congratulatory messages on the occasion of Eid al-Fitr and Nauryz. Tokayev expressed hopes for strengthened unity and stability in the Middle East. Diplomatic contacts intensified on March 23, when Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov held a telephone conversation with his Iranian counterpart Seyed Abbas Araghchi to discuss regional developments and possible steps toward reducing military tensions, including the need to maintain security in the Caspian region. On the same day, Turkmenistan’s Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov also spoke with Araghchi. Iranian readouts of the call warned that recent strikes could have security and environmental consequences for the Caspian Sea. Also on March 23, Tokayev received the United Arab Emirates Ambassador to Kazakhstan, Mohammed Said Mohammed al-Ariqi. During the meeting, Tokayev expressed concern over Iranian bombardments targeting the UAE, reiterated Kazakhstan’s opposition to involving neutral states in the conflict, and once again offered Kazakhstan as a platform for peace talks. The escalation affecting the Caspian region has therefore acted as a catalyst for intensified diplomatic engagement by Central Asian states and Azerbaijan aimed at steering the crisis toward dialogue. As Tokayev has suggested, such efforts may prove critical before the window for negotiated solutions narrows. As the conflict edges closer to key transit and energy routes, the stakes for Central Asia are no longer peripheral, but immediate.

Caspian Region

War Reaches the Caspian: Central Asia Faces Growing Regional Risk

The United States and Israel's war with Iran began on February 28, 2026. The intensity of the conflict has fluctuated, but daily reports of missile strikes and explosions are increasingly resonating across Central Asia. Meanwhile, Russia’s latest war against Ukraine has continued for 1,466 days since it began on February 24, 2022. Late last year, Ukrainian drones reportedly struck a Russian oil platform at the Filanovsky field in the Caspian Sea, more than 700 kilometers from Ukraine’s nearest border. Ukraine also said the operation targeted the patrol ship Okhotnik, although the extent of the damage was not independently verified. The war in Ukraine has also created serious challenges for Kazakhstan’s oil exports via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). Repeated attacks and disruptions have threatened export flows, increased logistical risks, and added pressure on Kazakhstan’s budget revenues. The war against Iran has now brought military action to the Caspian coast of Iran, raising concern for energy producers and transit routes across the wider region. On March 5, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that drones launched from Iranian territory struck the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. According to the ministry, one drone hit the terminal building at Nakhchivan International Airport, while another crashed near a school in the village of Shekerabad. Azerbaijan demanded a thorough investigation. Iran later stated that it had promised to investigate the incident. Azerbaijan’s Prosecutor General’s Office subsequently opened a criminal case. As of now, tensions remain high, with both sides continuing to exchange accusations, and Azerbaijan maintaining heightened alert measures. More recently, the Israeli Defense Forces confirmed carrying out airstrikes in northern Iran, targeting naval vessels in the port city of Bandar-Anzali on the Caspian coast. The straight-line distance from Bandar-Anzali to Azerbaijan’s capital, Baku, is just over 300 kilometers, and approximately 420 kilometers to Turkmenbashi, a major international seaport and the center of Turkmenistan’s oil-refining industry. The resort zone of Avaza is also located there. By comparison, the distance from Israel to Bandar-Anzali exceeds 1,300 kilometers. These developments are contributing to rising economic uncertainty across Central Asia. The consequences extend beyond transportation and logistics disruptions, with broader implications for regional economies. The U.S. and Israel have not always appeared aligned on what would constitute victory, meaning the measure of success remains difficult to gauge. While the United States and Israel have repeatedly stated that significant damage has been inflicted on Iran’s military infrastructure (including destroying a substantial part of the Iranian navy), there is no publicly available, independently verified evidence confirming the extent of the damage to Iran’s leadership structure following the death of Ali Khamenei, Ali Larijani and other senior Iranian figures, or on Iran’s ability to mount an effective defence. Analysts have described Iran’s military resilience as decentralized, sometimes using the term "mosaic defense," meaning units can continue operating under standing orders even when senior leadership is hit. It is understood that, as part of this strategy, the Iranian military has spent decades refining its ability to operate as independent nodes, each equipped to conduct strikes under preexisting standing orders. This means that each unit is effectively equipped to strike autonomously, irrespective of what is taking place in Tehran. The resilience of this strategy was demonstrated again today, when the Mina al-Ahmadi refinery in Kuwait was struck. While the U.S. and Israel claim to have degraded Iran’s overall military capability, Iran has continued to strike energy infrastructure across the Gulf. Iran has also shown it can severely disrupt traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and strike Gulf energy infrastructure. Given that neither the U.S. nor Israel currently appears to be willing to compromise or state clearly what would constitute ‘victory’ - absent a collapse of the regime in Tehran - forecasts about the duration of the conflict vary widely and remain speculative at best. These range from expectations of a rapid conclusion of hostilities to predictions that the war could continue for months. For now, despite sustained attacks, many have argued that Iran’s governing system appears relatively stable, and expectations of swift political change have failed to materialize. However, there may be internal tensions within Iran’s leadership. This possibility was raised by Kazakhstan’s President, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, during a press conference held in connection with a constitutional referendum. Tokayev stated: “As for Iranian President Pezeshkian, he recently paid us an official visit and made a very favorable impression. He is a man of secular views. I welcomed his statement that Iran would not attack the Arab Gulf states. He even expressed apologies on behalf of Iran in this regard. But then his statements were disavowed, effectively nullified. Iran has attacked and continues to attack the Arab Gulf states. This suggests that the President of Iran does not wield full authority. That is a fact.” 

For Central Asia, the significance of the conflict lies not in direct involvement but in proximity, exposure, and dependence. The Caspian Sea, long treated as a relatively insulated energy and transit space, is no longer peripheral to regional security calculations. What were once distant conflicts are now unfolding within operational reach of key infrastructure, shipping routes, and export corridors.

The combination of instability in the Middle East, continued disruption from the war in Ukraine, and uncertainty over Iran’s internal cohesion is creating a layered risk environment for the region. Energy flows, investor confidence, and transport reliability are all increasingly vulnerable to developments beyond Central Asia’s control.

For governments in the region, the challenge will be to preserve stability while navigating an external environment that is becoming more volatile, less predictable, and harder to hedge against.

Nauryz

The History of Nauryz: An Ancient Festival That Continues to Unite Central Asia

Ahead of the Nauryz holiday, The Times of Central Asia looks at the origins and enduring significance of one of the region’s oldest celebrations. More than a seasonal festival, Nauryz reflects a deep connection between people, nature, and cultural identity, a tradition that has evolved over thousands of years and remains central to life across Central Asia. Origins and Meaning

Nauryz, also known as Nowruz, is one of the world’s oldest holidays, marking the arrival of spring and the beginning of a new year. It is celebrated on the day of the spring equinox, when day and night are approximately equal and nature appears to begin a new cycle.

For many communities, the holiday symbolizes renewal, hope for prosperity, and the start of a new stage in life.

The name “Nowruz” derives from ancient Iranian words meaning “new day.” This concept lies at the heart of the celebration: the renewal of life and the symbolic rebirth of nature after winter.

With a history spanning more than 3,000 years, the holiday spread across Eurasia along the Silk Roads and became embedded in the cultural traditions of Central Asia, the Middle East, and the Caucasus. [caption id="attachment_45687" align="alignnone" width="300"] @depositphotos[/caption] Today, Nowruz is recognized not only as a calendar event but also as a cultural tradition that promotes values such as peace, mutual respect, and harmony with nature. Connection to the Spring Equinox Nauryz is traditionally celebrated during the spring equinox, which usually falls on March 20 or 21, when the Sun crosses the celestial equator and daylight and nighttime hours are nearly equal. Since ancient times, this moment has symbolized the awakening of nature and the beginning of a new agricultural year. Historical sources indicate that different communities once observed various dates in March, often guided by natural signs. Over time, however, the astronomical equinox, commonly observed on March 21, became the most widely accepted date. Medieval scholars paid close attention to this phenomenon. In the 11th and 12th centuries, astronomers such as Omar Khayyam refined calendar calculations to align the start of the year more precisely with the equinox. Alongside scientific knowledge, traditional methods were also used to forecast harvests and weather conditions, including observing seed germination or measuring the length of shadows before the holiday. Today, Nauryz is officially celebrated on March 21 in countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, while UNESCO also recognizes Nowruz as marking the first day of spring. Rituals and Traditions For centuries, Nauryz has been marked by rituals symbolizing renewal, fertility, and prosperity. Among both nomadic and settled communities, it has traditionally been celebrated with public festivities, games, and family gatherings. Common customs include ritual cleansing with water, exchanging gifts, and offering food to neighbors and guests. The altybakan swing is widely regarded as a symbol of spring and joy. In some regions, the ancient practice of jumping over fire has been preserved as a purification ritual. Food plays a central role in the celebration. Although culinary traditions vary by country, they share a common symbolism of abundance and new life. In Kazakhstan, the main festive dish is Nauryz kozhe, a soup prepared from seven ingredients representing prosperity and well-being. In Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, sumalak, a sweet dish made from sprouted wheat, is a key symbol of the holiday. Sumalak is traditionally prepared collectively, often overnight, with participants taking turns stirring the pot and making wishes. It is believed to bring prosperity and fertility. Festive tables also feature dishes such as plov, herb-filled samsa, and manty dumplings. Celebrations are typically accompanied by traditional games and competitions, including horse racing, wrestling, equestrian contests, and street performances. People gather around a shared dastarkhan, sing songs, visit relatives, and exchange wishes for health, peace, and prosperity. [caption id="attachment_45688" align="alignnone" width="300"] @depositphotos[/caption] From Suppression to Revival During the Soviet period, large-scale public celebrations of Nauryz were restricted, and many traditions were preserved mainly within families and local communities. From the late 1980s onward, however, the holiday began to experience a revival. Following the independence of Central Asian states, Nauryz was officially recognized as a public holiday across the region. Today, it is widely celebrated in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, with festivals, fairs, and public events held in major cities. Its international recognition underscores its cultural significance. In 2009, Nowruz was inscribed on UNESCO’s Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity, and since 2010 March 21 has been observed as the International Day of Nowruz.

Nauryz remains one of the most enduring cultural traditions in Central Asia, with its meaning preserved across generations.

Its emphasis on renewal and hospitality continues to bring communities together across borders and remains a familiar part of life across the region.

Diplomatic Talks

Xi Jinping and Berdymuhamedov Sr. Discuss Expansion of China-Turkmenistan Partnership

Chinese President Xi Jinping held talks with Gurbanguly Berdymuhamedov, Turkmenistan's former president and leader of its People's Council, during the latter’s official visit to China. The meeting took place on March 18 at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing, according to a statement from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Xi noted that China had recently completed its annual parliamentary meetings, commonly referred to as the “Two Sessions,” during which key socio-economic priorities were outlined. He said the country’s new development agenda would support modernization efforts and create additional opportunities for international cooperation.

The Chinese president said that mutual political support remains central to the comprehensive strategic partnership between Beijing and Ashgabat. He reaffirmed China’s readiness to continue backing Turkmenistan on issues related to sovereignty, territorial integrity, and its internationally recognized policy of permanent neutrality.

Xi and Berdymuhamedov discussed expanding cooperation in the energy sector, particularly natural gas supplies, as well as in trade, investment, transport connectivity, agriculture, artificial intelligence, the digital economy, and clean energy. Both leaders also highlighted the importance of aligning China’s Belt and Road Initiative with Turkmenistan’s plans to revitalize historic Silk Road trade routes.

Humanitarian cooperation was another focus of the talks, including plans to develop educational and cultural exchanges and establish joint centers. The leaders also discussed coordination on regional security challenges, including efforts to counter terrorism, separatism, and extremism.

Berdymuhamedov reaffirmed Turkmenistan’s commitment to the One China principle and expressed readiness to deepen bilateral cooperation in energy, infrastructure, and trade. He said closer ties with China were important for Turkmenistan’s long-term economic development and again noted Beijing’s support for the country’s neutrality policy.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi also attended the meeting.

As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, the visit followed Berdymuhamedov’s trip to the United States in mid-February, the details of which were not fully disclosed.

Shortly after his return, Turkmenistan’s President, Gurbanguly's son Serdar Berdymuhamedov, dismissed the country’s ambassador to the U.S. and its permanent representative to the United Nations. No official explanation was provided for the personnel changes.