Uzbekistan Announces New Electricity Rationing Amid Power Shortages
Uzbekistan has announced a new electricity rationing schedule as power shortages strain the national grid. The Ministry of Energy said temporary evening outages would help stabilize supply while repairs and emergency measures continue. The outages, which began this week, are concentrated during peak hours between 5:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. and are expected to last until mid-January.
Causes of the Shortfall
The crisis stems from a major failure at the Syrdarya thermal power plant, one of the country’s largest. A newly installed Mitsubishi gas turbine suffered a mechanical fault in late November, forcing the station to shut down part of its capacity. A replacement 114-ton rotor was delivered by air on December 8, and engineers expect to finish installation and testing in four weeks. Seasonal factors have also reduced the available power supply. With winter’s shorter daylight hours, output from solar stations has dropped significantly, increasing the load on the grid. An unexpected gas supply disruption has further strained generation: Energy Minister Jurabek Mirzamakhmudov revealed that an accident in a neighboring country’s network cut Uzbekistan’s gas intake by about 6 million cubic meters per day. Natural gas fuels a large share of the country’s power plants, so this drop in fuel supply, combined with cloudy weather, has constrained electricity production. “Because of rain, there was neither wind nor sun,” Mirzamakhmudov said. These factors combined have left the grid struggling to meet peak demand in early December.Peak-Hour Outages to Balance Demand
Officials have emphasized that rolling blackouts will be kept brief and targeted; each outage is not expected to last more than about two hours, and consumers will be notified in advance whenever possible. By shedding some load at peak times, the grid can avoid more dangerous unplanned breakdowns and ensure critical facilities remain powered. Residents have also been urged to use electricity sparingly and to monitor official announcements, rather than panic if an interruption occurs.
The Energy Ministry has stressed that rumors of any nationwide “blackout” are unfounded, and any power cuts will be localized and limited in scope, not a return to the wide-ranging outages seen in the past. Citizens have been cautioned against spreading unverified information on social media and encouraged to rely on updates from authorities.
Winter Energy Challenges and Reforms
Winter months have historically tested Uzbekistan’s energy infrastructure. In previous years, electricity deficits forced scheduled outages – commonly known as rolling blackouts – across the country. However, officials note that the situation has improved markedly due to new power projects and efficiency measures. According to Energy Ministry data, the volume of electricity consumption that had to be curtailed through such restrictions fell from about 4 billion kWh in 2013 to just 357 million kWh in 2024. Even during the Central Asian energy crisis of winter 2022, Uzbekistan’s forced power cuts totaled around 2 billion kWh, a figure that has since sharply declined as new capacity comes online.
Uzbekistan has been racing to expand its electricity generation to meet growing demand and reduce chronic winter shortages. The government has partnered with international firms to build modern gas-fired plants and large renewable energy projects. As a result, wind and solar power output have surged. The country’s solar and wind farms generated a record 10 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity this year, saving an estimated 2.7 billion cubic meters of natural gas that would otherwise have been burned for power. Still, these gains can be hampered by seasonal conditions: on cold, overcast days, when new solar panels and wind turbines yield less energy. By announcing targeted evening rationing now, the authorities hope to manage the current shortfall in a controlled way and avoid a repeat of the widespread outages that have plagued past winters.
Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Available Sunday
As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. The new episode, available this Sunday, will be dedicated to 16 Days Against Gender-Based Violence, with guests Svetlana Dzardanova, a gender and human rights researcher for Freedom for Eurasia, based in Bishkek, and Dariana Gryaznova, Eurasia consultant with Equality Now.
Vatican, Uzbekistan United in Pursuit of Diplomacy and Peace
On 6 December 2025, Pope Leo XIV accepted the credentials of thirteen new ambassadors, among them Abat Fayzullaev of Uzbekistan, in Vatican City’s splendid, fresco-festooned Sala Clementia in the Apostolic Palace. The accreditation of Uzbekistan’s ambassador marks a further milestone in the development of Tashkent’s relations with the Holy See. Addressing the new diplomats, Pope Leo XIV asserted the primacy the Holy See accords peace and diplomacy, and its conviction that peace can take root whenever the will to embrace it exists. “Peace is not merely the absence of conflict, but an active and demanding gift, one that is built in the heart and from the heart,” the Pope stated. He called on the ambassadors and the governments they represent to renounce “pride and vindictiveness,” and to resist “the temptation to use words as weapons. This vision of peace has become all the more urgent as geopolitical tension and fragmentation continue to deepen in ways that burden nations and that strain the bonds of the human family.” Pope Leo XIV said the Vatican would continue to publicly condemn grave inequalities, human rights abuses, and systemic injustice, while it defended the dignity of the poor and vulnerable. This assertion is consistent with the Church’s age-old social teaching and constitutes a veiled jab at the global economic system and its evident defects from the Christian perspective. In line with Central Asia’s broader interest in stability and common-good capitalism, Pope Leo told the ambassadors that “in times of global instability, the poorest and most marginalized often suffer most.” He encouraged the new ambassadors to help lay "the foundations for a more just, fraternal and peaceful world." Uzbekistan has struck a similar chord but from a different angle: “If the greatest gift given to man is life, then the greatest goal humanity has always strived for is, without a doubt, peace and harmony. That is why we always wish each other peace and tranquility, health, and well-being,” Kahramon Sariyev, Chairman of the Committee on Interethnic Relations and Compatriots Abroad of the Republic of Uzbekistan, stated. Central Asians will surely welcome the Pope’s belief that “religions and interreligious dialogue can make a fundamental contribution to fostering a climate of peace and that truly peaceful relationships cannot be built apart from truth.” Uzbekistan's state media—along with those of other Central Asian countries—have pointed out repeatedly that genuine interfaith and interethnic dialogue is not only possible but essential for peace and stability—perhaps an indication of the impact Central Asia’s Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions has had in calling for a diplomacy rooted in respect for diverse traditions and cultural mores. Tashkent’s diplomatic engagement with the Vatican—embodied in the Uzbek ambassador’s accreditation to the Holy See last week—reflects a convergence of values. The Pope’s call for dialogue over discord sets the stage for deeper Vatican cooperation with Uzbekistan and the wider Central Asian region.
FIFA World Cup: Uzbekistan to Face Portugal and Colombia in Group K
Among the highlights for Uzbekistan at next year’s FIFA World Cup will be facing Portugal striker Cristiano Ronaldo in his last campaign in the event, to be held in Mexico, Canada and the United States. Uzbekistan, which has qualified for the World Cup for the first time and is ranked 50th in the FIFA rankings, is in the four-team group K, one of 12 groups in the draw that was announced on Friday in Washington D.C. Group K includes sixth-ranked Portugal; Colombia, which is 13th in the FIFA standings; and a fourth team that is yet to be decided. Either Jamaica, Democratic Republic of Congo or New Caledonia will take that last spot after facing each other in playoffs. A total of 48 teams are competing in the World Cup next year, up from 32 in previous contests. Ronaldo, 40, has said next year’s World Cup will be his last one. In Qatar in 2022, he became the first player to score at five World Cups. He currently plays for Al-Nassr in Saudi Arabia. Uzbekistan’s team is led by coach Fabio Cannavaro, a former defender who was captain of Italy’s winning team in the 2006 World Cup in Germany. Cannavaro replaced Timur Kapadze, an Uzbekistani former pro football player who led Uzbekistan’s national team to its first-ever qualification for the World Cup with a 0-0 draw against the United Arab Emirates in Abu Dhabi in June. “Everything” can happen in the World Cup, a smiling Cannavaro said after the draw was announced. “We are so happy because we are here,” the coach said, adding that he hoped the team would fight “until the end.”
Information Sovereignty? Central Asia Tightens Control Over Its Information Space
Across the post-Soviet space, governments are adopting new measures that affect the scope of free expression. Similar trends are visible in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and parts of Eastern Europe, reflecting wider global shifts in how states manage their information environments. In Central Asia, where journalism has long faced political constraints, recent policies indicate a renewed emphasis on controlling the flow of information. From Georgia to Kazakhstan: Pushback Against Foreign Narratives Recent events in Georgia highlight these changes. The adoption of a controversial “foreign agents” law, widely described as a Russian-style or “pro-Russian” measure, reflected the ruling party’s growing hostility to foreign-funded media and NGOs, many backed by European donors, and triggered mass pro-EU protests in Tbilisi. Similar dynamics are emerging in Central Asia, where officials increasingly view foreign narratives as interference in domestic affairs. In Kazakhstan, legislative restrictions on so-called "LGBT propaganda" have sparked both domestic protests and criticism from international partners. At the same time, well-known media figure Gulnar Bazhkenova, editor-in-chief of Orda.kz, has been placed under house arrest, an episode that underscores the tightening environment for journalists. The Bazhkenova Case: A Turning Point for Kazakh Media Bazhkenova, a prominent editor known for critical coverage of Kazakhstan’s political elite and security services, came under scrutiny after Orda.kz falsely reported the arrest of Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu, an unverified claim that was quickly debunked. Although Nurtleu remained in his position immediately afterward, he was dismissed later in September, prompting speculation that the incident had political consequences. Soon after his departure, law enforcement launched an investigation into Bazhkenova. On December 1, Almaty police searched her residence and the offices of Orda.kz. Authorities stated that a 2024 article had disseminated false information regarding a law enforcement officer allegedly caught accepting a bribe, an incident that officials assert never occurred. Another article reportedly misrepresented details in a property dispute, allegedly damaging the business reputation of the involved party. The Almaty police have since opened additional investigations into past publications from Orda.kz that may contain misleading content. Media organizations have largely responded with condemnation, urging the authorities to decriminalize the dissemination of false information and instead treat such cases under civil law. However, the Union of Journalists of Kazakhstan issued a pointed statement calling on media professionals to “treat the preparation and dissemination of information responsibly. Individual cases for the dissemination of inaccurate information cast a shadow on the entire journalistic community of our country,” the organization said. An implicit acknowledgment, perhaps, that Bazhkenova’s actions may have crossed legal or ethical boundaries. Parallel Cases and Regional Patterns While suppression of the media in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan has long been widespread, Kyrgyzstan - long considered the most politically open country in Central Asia - has also moved to tighten control over its information space. In early 2024, authorities introduced a controversial “foreign representatives” law requiring NGOs and media outlets receiving international funding to register under a special status, echoing legislation seen in Russia and Georgia. Independent outlets such as Kloop, Temirov Live, and Azattyk (RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz service) have faced lawsuits, blocked websites, or forced suspension of activities under charges ranging from extremism to spreading false information. Journalists and media advocates warn that these measures, combined with new restrictions on “false” online content, represent a significant rollback of Kyrgyzstan’s traditionally pluralistic media environment and signal the government’s growing interest in asserting information sovereignty. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have also recently come under scrutiny for what some view as selective crackdowns tied to geopolitical alignments. This autumn, both countries detained bloggers seen as sympathetic to Russia's geopolitical narrative. In Kazakhstan, blogger Aslan Tolegenov, known online as "Northern_Kazakh", was convicted in November for inciting interethnic hatred, receiving a sentence of three years and nine months. Tolegenov was known for videos expressing pro-Russian views on the war in Ukraine and presenting himself as defending Russian speakers against what he called “Russophobia” in Kazakhstan. In Uzbekistan, blogger Aziz Khakimov, known as "Comrade_Aziz," was first fined in August for spreading false information about a university rector. A month later, prosecutors added charges including incitement of interethnic hatred, defamation, and war propaganda. The investigation was initiated after journalist Nikita Makarenko accused Khakimov of slander in a video. If convicted, Khakimov faces up to 10 years in prison. A Region Redrawing Its Media Boundaries Russian media outlets supportive of the so-called "Russian World" ideology have decried these arrests as betrayals by supposed allies. Yet, the broader trend suggests that regional governments are increasingly prioritizing what they view as information sovereignty. Whether targeting liberal media outlets, pro-Russian influencers, or independent journalists, the common thread is a concerted effort to control narratives within their borders. From Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan, these actions reflect a growing consensus among Central Asian elites: foreign narratives, whether from Russia, the West, or elsewhere, are increasingly seen not as pluralism but as threats to national unity.
China’s Power Play in Central Asia’s Energy Sector
China is steadily expanding its influence in Central Asia’s oil and gas sector through multi-billion-dollar investments, long-term supply agreements, and a growing network of strategic partnerships. From Kazakhstan to Turkmenistan, Beijing’s state-backed companies are securing key upstream and midstream assets, financing new petrochemical and pipeline projects, and positioning themselves as indispensable players in the region’s resource development.
This expansion is driven not only by China’s rising energy demand, but also by Beijing’s ambition to establish durable overland energy corridors that reduce reliance on maritime routes vulnerable to disruption. Central Asia’s existing and planned pipelines provide China with rare direct access to oil and gas fields across its western frontier, making the region a focal point of its broader energy-security strategy and a cornerstone of Beijing’s efforts to diversify supply while deepening political and economic footholds across Eurasia.
Kazakhstan Eyes Chinese Investment Amid Lukoil Sanctions Kazakhstan may seek to transfer Russian company Lukoil’s stake in the offshore Kalamkas-Khazar oil and gas project to a new partner, with some industry channels, including the Telegram channel Energy Monitor, speculating about possible Chinese interest. Lukoil, which has been targeted by Western sanctions, is reportedly planning to exit Kalamkas-Khazar Operating LLP, a joint venture with KazMunayGas (KMG). Each company currently holds a 50% stake. Some commentators have suggested that a Chinese investor could step in, but no replacement has been officially confirmed. Seconded engineers from KMG Engineering are expected to be withdrawn from the project as of January 1, 2026, with several Kalamkas-Khazar staff members temporarily reassigned to other KMG subsidiaries until a new partner is confirmed. The project is considered highly promising, with earlier estimates citing reserves of 81 million tons of oil and 22 billion cubic meters of gas. New exploration has identified additional oil-bearing structures. A final investment decision (FID) worth more than $6.5 billion was originally expected by the end of 2025. However, U.S. sanctions against Lukoil have delayed progress. Located 120 km from the Kashagan field in the North Caspian Basin, the Kalamkas-Khazar block comprises the Kalamkas-More and Khazar fields. The site is situated in Kazakhstan’s Mangistau Region, 60 km from the Buzachi Peninsula. KazMunayGas Chairman Askhat Khasenov previously confirmed that production was expected to begin in 2028-2029, with peak output reaching four million tons annually. Lukoil was sanctioned by the UK on October 15, followed by the U.S., complicating ongoing negotiations. Despite this, major projects where Lukoil holds minority stakes, such as Tengiz, Karachaganak, and the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, have not been impacted. A Lukoil withdrawal would create a rare opening for China to secure its first significant offshore position in the North Caspian, a zone historically dominated by Western majors and Russian firms. Such an entry would represent a notable shift in Kazakhstan’s offshore partnership landscape. Beijing's Billion-Dollar Energy Deals in Kazakhstan In September 2025, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev announced a series of energy deals with China valued at $1.5 billion. During his official visit to China, more than 70 commercial agreements totaling approximately $15 billion were signed, several directly involving Kazakhstan’s oil and gas sector. The breadth of agreements indicates that Kazakhstan is aiming to move beyond raw-resource exports and position itself as a regional petrochemical and processing hub integrated with Chinese industrial supply chains. Key projects include the construction of a gas chemical complex in the Aktobe Region to produce urea, with China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) expected to invest around $1 billion. The China Development Bank has also signaled its readiness to finance the construction of trunk pipelines for transporting ethane and propane in the Atyrau Region, with investment volumes reported at around $530 million. China’s CNOOC has been reported as receiving a contract for exploration and production at the Zhylyoi field in the Atyrau Region in June, and on December 3, KazMunayGas launched a joint venture with Sinopec to carry out geological surveys. In October, KazMunayGas announced a new contract with a Sinopec subsidiary to explore and develop hydrocarbons in the Berezovsky area of the West Kazakhstan Region. During a visit to China in August 2024, KMG Chairman Askhat Khasenov held high-level meetings with CNPC and Sinopec to discuss joint ventures in petrochemicals, geological exploration, refining, and transport. Among the projects was the urea complex, addressing Kazakhstan’s domestic demand of 350,000-400,000 tons annually. Other initiatives include gas processing at the Urihtau field, expansion of the Shymkent Oil Refinery (PKOP LLP), and increasing capacity along the Atyrau-Kenkik and Kenkik-Kumkol oil pipelines. Additionally, talks covered plans to manufacture polyethylene, terephthalic acid (TFC), and polyethylene terephthalate (PET), with total investments that could exceed $8 billion. Many of these projects fall under the China–Kazakhstan Industrial Capacity Cooperation framework, which Beijing uses to export Chinese engineering, technology, and financing models abroad. Despite strengthening ties with Beijing, Kazakh officials stress that the country remains open to investment from the U.S., Russia, and the European Union. The development of Kazakhstan’s fuel and energy complex remains a central pillar of the national economic strategy. China's Deepening Energy Ties with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan China is also solidifying its energy partnerships with Uzbekistan. In October, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Energy met with a CNPC delegation led by Chairman Dai Houliang to discuss projects such as the Central Asia-China gas pipeline, new gas condensate field development in the Bukhara Region, underground storage construction, and workforce training for the energy sector. CNPC’s direct investments in Uzbekistan now exceed $5 billion. Through its joint venture with Uzbekneftegaz, CNPC has built parts of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline, developed the Mingbulak oil field, and modernized the Bukhara refinery. Uzbekistan has embraced Chinese financing as it works to reverse declining gas output and manage recurring domestic shortages, making Beijing an increasingly vital partner in stabilizing the sector. In Turkmenistan, CNPC is developing the fourth phase of the massive Galkynysh gas field, with a planned annual capacity of ten billion cubic meters. This project follows high-level talks between President Serdar Berdimuhamedov and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing in September. China currently imports about 40 billion cubic meters of Turkmen gas annually via three pipeline routes: A, B, and C. With the completion of Line D, total export capacity is expected to rise to 65 billion cubic meters per year. Turkmenistan sends more than 80% of its gas exports to China, giving Beijing unparalleled leverage in the country’s energy sector and making the completion of Line D strategically important for both sides. China’s Emerging Dominance in Central Asia’s Energy ArchitectureTaken together, these developments show how China is embedding itself across the entire Central Asian energy ecosystem, not only as a buyer of hydrocarbons but increasingly as a financier, operator, and industrial partner. Beijing’s state-backed companies are moving upstream into exploration and production, downstream into petrochemicals and refining, and horizontally into pipeline construction, gas storage, and equipment manufacturing. This multi-layered presence is allowing China to shape investment decisions, infrastructure layout, and export routes across Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.
By leveraging long-term financing, rapid project execution, and integration into Chinese supply chains, Beijing is steadily building structural influence in a region where Russia once dominated and where Western companies now play more selective roles. The result is an emerging energy order in which China is positioned not simply as a commercial actor, but as a central external power capable of setting the pace and direction of the region’s resource development.
Why Regional Connectivity Is Reshaping Central Asia: Insights from ISRS Director Eldor Aripov (Part Two)
The Times of Central Asia presents the second part of an interview in Washington, D.C. with Eldor Aripov, Director of the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of Uzbekistan. Dr. Aripov sat down with our Washington Correspondent, Javier M. Piedra, to discuss Uzbekistan’s geoeconomic and geopolitical strategic thinking.
The conversation focused on Uzbekistan’s and the region’s efforts to cooperate diplomatically to maintain peace and stability with neighbors, irrespective of historical “hotspots,” cultural sensitivities, or the all-important matter of water resources. Aripov comments on Afghanistan, Chabahar Port (Iran), Ferghana Valley, and business development – key for U.S. investors thinking about Uzbekistan and the broader Central Asian region.
TCA: What message do you have for businesses and private investors who do not have any experience in Central Asia? Many companies are sniffing around at this time – what do you want to tell them?
Aripov: Uzbekistan is ready for committed investors - those who deliver lasting benefits, quality jobs, and shared prosperity. A decade of reforms has strengthened our fiscal discipline, boosted SMEs, and anchored stability. Coupled with our focus on good relations and a secure, integrated Central Asia, we offer a reliable platform for long-term, sustainable investment. While we have more work to do, we invite you to be part of our momentum.
TCA: What are the risks that companies might face when considering long-term investment?
Aripov: No country is immune to downside risks – not only in the developed but developing world. Having said that, downside risks, including trade shocks, commodity price volatility, tighter external financing, and contingent liabilities from state-owned enterprises, are mostly exogenous factors driven by global conditions. Risks are mitigated through political stability, diversification of the economy, prudent macroeconomic management, and reforms to state-owned enterprises and governance. For more in-depth commentary, I refer you to recent IMF, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank assessments about our economic conditions and trends.
TCA: Let me move on to more regional issues. The first Ferghana Peace Forum was held in October 2025. How can it serve as a replicable model for other regions seeking sustainable peace?
Aripov: First of all, I’d like to put this important forum on everyone’s radar. I’d like to underscore that peace is possible when hard work, respect for others, and a commitment to understanding guide our actions, despite historical memories and past differences. Someone should write a case study about our ability to bring consensus into an otherwise challenging region.
In any event, the inaugural Ferghana Peace Forum brought together over 300 participants from more than 20 countries — representatives of Central Asian governments, international organizations, leading think tanks, research institutions, and local communities. A joint communiqué was adopted, confirming the intention to institutionalize the Forum as a permanent platform with rotating hosts.
This broad participation highlighted an important reality: the Ferghana Valley is no longer viewed as a fragile zone; it is now viewed as a model of pragmatic peacebuilding. The Forum demonstrated how regional leadership — particularly the openness and good-neighborliness promoted by President Mirziyoyev — has transformed a once-sensitive area into a space of trust, connectivity, and shared development.
The uniqueness of this experience lies in its practicality, i.e., success was a function of being able to reach a practical, verifiable compromise acceptable to all parties.
The Ferghana model is built on concrete agreements and workable mechanisms: open borders for people and trade; joint resource management, including water; and continuous dialogue among governments, experts, and communities. This approach addresses the root causes of conflict by creating tangible economic benefits and predictable relations among neighbors. It also allows for dialogue to resolve differences when they may arise.
[caption id="attachment_40333" align="aligncenter" width="525"]
Image: Silk Road Research, Ferghana Valley[/caption]
TCA: But you would agree that without political will, success is largely ephemeral, right?
Aripov: You are correct, but, fortunately, here in Central Asia, there is, without a doubt, the political will. Maybe our success in bringing peace to the Ferghana Valley is a result of our practicality. Central Asian leaders have chosen cooperation over competition, consensus over unilateral actions, and development over tension — reviving a historical “code of harmony” that shaped the Ferghana Valley for centuries. The Forum amplified this reality by giving a platform not only to officials and experts, but also to women and youth initiatives, emphasizing that sustainable peace grows from the bottom up.
The model shows that peace is achievable when countries focus on interdependence rather than dividing lines. It demonstrates that even deep-rooted challenges — border disputes, resource competition, social fragmentation — can be resolved through sustained political dialogue, shared economic incentives, and inclusive participation.
TCA: When and where will the next forum take place, and what ideas are being considered to make the agenda more substantive?
Aripov: Preparations for the next Forum are underway, with several cities in the Ferghana Valley — including Khujand and Manas — being considered. Consultations with Kyrgyz and Tajik partners are ongoing. The next meeting will be even more results-oriented, with expanded discussions on transboundary clusters in logistics, agriculture, water resources, and digital technologies. A special focus will be placed on youth, education, and local initiatives. The idea of introducing the “Ferghana Principles” - good neighborliness, equality, and mutual respect – as a conceptual framework to support other fragile regions is also being explored.
TCA: Water management issues remain complex. Many fear that Afghanistan’s 285-km Qosh-Tepa Canal – a priority project for the Taliban-run government of Afghanistan – will divert a significant portion of the Amu Darya River – the largest river in Central Asia – and reduce water inflows into Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. How is your dialogue with Afghanistan progressing?
Aripov: Concerns regarding the Qosh-Tepa Canal are understandable. The Amu Darya basin is already under pressure from climate change, population growth, and rising irrigation needs. Experts are worried that “too much” water removal from the river – remember that Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are downstream – affects the entire regional ecosystem, agricultural landscape, and community relations. This is a delicate issue, but one that is being addressed calmly and responsibly.
Uzbekistan has chosen a principled, forward-looking approach — prioritizing dialogue, cooperation, and mutual understanding with Afghanistan. We believe in common sense and diplomacy.
President Mirziyoyev has repeatedly emphasized that stability and predictability in the Amu Darya basin are impossible without Afghanistan’s involvement as a full-fledged partner in negotiations and in the region. Uzbekistan was the first country in the region to initiate structured consultations with Kabul on water management.
The livelihoods of millions — farmers, rural communities, and entire sectors — depend on the stability and predictability of water flows. For this reason, we advocate a science-based approach, transparency in water usage, and its equitable and fair distribution. Domestically, we are accelerating the adoption of modern irrigation, water-saving technologies, and digital monitoring. We want to lead by example, and that is why responsible stewardship begins at home.
The broader stability of Central Asia will depend on how effectively the region engages Afghanistan, which is recovering from years of instability. President Mirziyoyev’s position has been consistent and well-received: only dialogue, mutual interests, and the gradual institutionalization of cooperation can preserve the Amu Darya as a vital artery for all.
Towards this end, an important step to reaching mutual understandings was the International Conference on Water Diplomacy held in Tashkent on 10 April 2025, where Afghanistan participated with a high-level delegation and expressed readiness for constructive engagement. Discussions are ongoing, and we have every expectation that issues regarding water usage will be addressed to the benefit of all.
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Map of the Amu Darya River; image: Zoi Environment[/caption]
TCA: Uzbekistan and Afghanistan maintain relations at the ambassadorial level. Why does Uzbekistan view the integration of Afghanistan into Central Asian processes as a positive step for security and economic development?
Aripov: As I alluded to earlier, for Uzbekistan, Afghanistan’s integration into regional processes is not an abstract geopolitical concept — it is a practical question of security and development.
Our position rests on a simple principle: The more isolated Afghanistan is, the higher the risks for Central Asia; the more it is included in regional mechanisms, the more stable the region becomes.
From a security perspective, Uzbekistan believes that vacuums generate threats. When a country lacks economic opportunities, international partnerships, and pathways to integration, conditions arise for radicalization, illegal migration, and narcotics trafficking. This is why involving Afghanistan in transport, energy, and trade projects is not a gesture of goodwill but a strategic investment in shared stability.
Economically, Afghanistan remains the shortest route to the ports of the Indian Ocean. Access to these markets reduces transport distances, lowers cost structures, and increases the competitiveness of Uzbek exports — all central to our diversification strategy.
Most importantly, regional thinking is changing. Central Asian leaders declared in Tashkent recently that Afghanistan is historically, culturally, and economically part of our region.
Uzbekistan’s approach has been not only consistent but optimistic: integrating Afghanistan is possible and will reduce risks that lead to instability. Integration will create new economic opportunities and strengthen interdependence — the foundation of a resilient region. A stable Afghanistan means a stable Central Asia, and Uzbekistan is playing an active role in this process.
TCA: India has signed a 10-year agreement for the management of the Chabahar port. Assuming the U.S. does not cancel its sanctions waiver on the use of the port, how do you assess the importance of Chabahar for Uzbekistan’s trade flows alongside the Middle Corridor?
Aripov: For Uzbekistan, the question has never been “either–or.” For a double-landlocked country, every new route is not merely an economic advantage but an element of national resilience.
India’s decade-long agreement, the reopening of its embassy in Kabul, and the U.S. sanctions waiver all signal that Chabahar will remain operational and connected to global markets. This is critical for us: predictability and long-term guarantees are the key factors for investors, exporters, and logistics operators.
Chabahar complements — rather than replaces — the Middle Corridor, the Trans-Afghan route, and our growing network of logistics links with the Gulf states.
Together, these routes form an architecture of connectivity that reduces transport costs, expands export geography, and strengthens economic independence.
There is also a geopolitical dimension: the more connected Central Asia becomes with different regions, the more stable and predictable it is. This fully aligns with President Mirziyoyev’s vision of Central Asia as an open, integrated, and dynamic region.
For part one of our interview with Dr. Eldor Aripov, click here.
The New Geoeconomics of Uzbekistan: Insights from ISRS Director Eldor Aripov
The Times of Central Asia presents a two-part interview in Washington, D.C. with Eldor Aripov, Director of the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of Uzbekistan. Dr. Aripov sat down with our Washington Correspondent, Javier M. Piedra, to discuss Uzbekistan’s strategic thinking regarding its diplomatic posture, regional integration, and relations with Central Asian and global partners.
The conversation includes commentary on “Great Game” geopolitics, U.S.–Uzbekistan relations, trade, the meaning of “Uzbekistan First,” the historically explosive Ferghana Valley, and water management.
Recognizing the link between investment, a stable geopolitical ecosystem, and the need to de-risk potentially conflictive issues, Aripov further sheds light on Tashkent’s practical approach to internal governance and business development.
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Central Asia on the Front Lines; image: Defense.info[/caption]
TCA: “America First” refers to U.S. policies prioritizing national interests, often associated with non-interventionism, nationalism, and protectionist trade. Given Uzbekistan’s pragmatic foreign policy, can we speak of an “Uzbekistan First” policy? It is certainly not isolationist — but how is it manifested on a day-to-day basis?
Aripov: What you describe as “Uzbekistan First” is, in our understanding, fundamentally about prioritizing national interests – stability and predictability for the people of Uzbekistan. Yet Uzbekistan’s uniqueness lies in the fact that our national interests are closely intertwined with those of the entire region – this means shared upsides at the transactional and strategic levels and thinking long-term. We border every Central Asian country as well as Afghanistan, and therefore any issue — security, trade, transport, or water management — directly depends on the quality of our relationships with neighbors.
From his first days in office, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev — with his strategic vision and deep understanding of regional dynamics — declared that regional unity and mutual benefit stand at the core of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy. The essence of his doctrine is to resolve agreeably any historically or materially problematic issues with neighbors, remove barriers to understanding, and create predictable, stable conditions for mutually beneficial cooperation and the free movement of goods, ideas, and people.
That is the true meaning of “Uzbekistan First”: not isolation, but openness, predictability, and regional consolidation.
TCA: How are you realizing “Uzbekistan First” in practice?
Aripov: Uzbekistan is strengthening its economy domestically and global track - putting in place the building blocks for internal sustainable development and accelerating accession to the World Trade Organization. The latter means expanding the geography and composition of exports and increasing the country’s investment attractiveness.
This approach is rooted in the logic of sustainable development within the broader international context: long-term national interests are best served by Uzbekistan integrating into global value chains and markets. The results speak for themselves: in 2024, Uzbekistan’s GDP grew by 6.5%, foreign direct investment increased by more than 50% to reach $11.9 billion, and the target for 2025 is to attract $42 billion. This performance is also a tribute to our style of diplomacy, grounded in respect and having a constructive attitude towards others.
Thus, “Uzbekistan First” represents a modern model of open, dynamic, and diversified growth in which national interests are achieved through cooperation rather than autarky and bullying.
TCA: Many in Central Asia view the United States’ heightened attention to the region as a sign of support that goes beyond rhetoric and small talk. How is this U.S. new engagement manifested? Given that some observers in the West see engagement with Central Asia as part of a larger geopolitical contest, do you expect U.S. interests to materialize tangibly?
Aripov: Neither Uzbekistan nor any country in Central Asia is interested in reviving the logic of the “Great Game.” It runs counter to our interests. Our choice is cooperation, not confrontation; partnership, not rivalry.
Competition exists in the region, but we seek to ensure it remains healthy and conducive to development. What matters most is access to technology, investment, and modern standards of education and governance. These practical needs — not geopolitical maneuvering — explain the growing dynamism of our relations with the United States.
Our engagement with the U.S. is highly practical: human-capital development programs, credit-guarantee instruments, infrastructure modernization, cooperation on energy, water resources, and agricultural technologies.
TCA: What is your response to those who urge Central Asian countries to abandon their balanced, non-ideological diplomacy and take sides in the geopolitical ambitions of others?
Aripov: While I only speak for Uzbekistan, Central Asian states are not guided by ideological or bloc-based considerations. They follow a pragmatic course built on common sense, balance, and diversification. The key principle is pragmatic geoeconomics over ideological geopolitics — the best way to minimize dependency risks and maximize benefits.
The region consistently demonstrates adherence to international norms and commitments, including partnerships with long-standing allies. Attempts to draw Central Asia into confrontational geopolitics lack foundation and are contrary to our way of thinking.
TCA: Given Russia and China’s strategic presence in Central Asia, do these relationships hinder Uzbekistan from deepening its ties with the United States or the European Union?
Aripov: Russia and China are Central Asia’s largest trade and investment partners, accounting for about half of the region’s external trade. They play central roles in transport, energy, and industrial infrastructure.
Western partners fully recognize this reality. “Replacement” is neither feasible nor desired. To be sure, we do not believe in zero-sum engagement.
TCA: What do you mean by zero-sum?
Aripov: Uzbekistan builds its foreign policy not on the logic of “friend or foe” or of “win or lose” but on a “partner-partner” basis – on a win-win attitude. Having said that, we have a three-pillar strategy which includes: diversification of economic and technological partners; non-alignment with military-political blocs; and pragmatic, project-oriented diplomacy grounded in national development interests.
This must be absolutely clear. Such a model strengthens our resilience and strategic autonomy, creating space for deeper and more fruitful engagement with both Eastern and Western partners.
TCA: A recent U.S. readout noted that Presidents Trump and Mirziyoyev announced Uzbekistan’s willingness to invest billions in the United States and in U.S. companies. What concrete steps are being taken to implement this vision?
Aripov: This is not only about Uzbekistan investing in the United States; equally important are American investments in Uzbekistan, new trade deals, access to advanced technologies, integration into global governance standards, and the development of high-tech production capacities inside Uzbekistan.
A clear architecture is being established to implement these agreements and priorities.
An American-Uzbek Business and Investment Council has been created as a new platform to strengthen bilateral trade and investment cooperation. It will be co-chaired by the Head of the Presidential Administration of Uzbekistan and a representative of the U.S. President.
TCA: When will that happen?
Aripov: Starting in 2026, the liberalization of cross-border financial operations will allow Uzbek companies to invest abroad and American companies to operate more freely in Uzbekistan.
Diplomatic and project-coordination capacity is also being enhanced: within Uzbekistan’s Embassy in Washington, a new position of Minister-Counselor representing the Presidential Administration has been established to promote major investment and trade projects.
Institutional support is expanding — EXIM Bank and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) are opening opportunities for large-scale financing.
Meanwhile, the United States is becoming an even bigger market for Uzbek textiles, copper, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and polymers.
Bilateral cooperation is therefore shifting from political dialogue to a deep technological and industrial partnership. That is good news.
TCA: The 7th Consultative Meeting of Central Asian Heads of State was held in Tashkent on 16 November 2025. How can Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan strengthen their partnership while balancing the expectations of major regional actors?
Aripov: Azerbaijan’s decision to join the Consultative Format of Central Asian Leaders is truly historic. As President Mirziyoyev noted, a new strategic bridge has emerged between Central Asia and the South Caucasus.
This tie-up is of fundamental importance for our region.
The key structural challenge for Central Asia is transport and logistics: being landlocked makes imported goods abnormally expensive, with transport costs exceeding 50% of final prices.
Azerbaijan plays a pivotal role in the Middle Corridor, opening the way for Central Asia to European markets. The more actively we trade, invest, and develop joint infrastructure, the more resilient the entire region becomes.
Particularly important is President Mirziyoyev’s proposal to transform the Consultative Meetings into a Community of Central Asia — a mature, institutionalized structure capable of shaping rules, standards, and long-term development plans. We are confident this is where the region is heading.
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