Milan Design Week

From a Vanishing Sea to Milan’s Spotlight: When Apricots Blossom, a Lost Sea Speaks

From April 20 to 26, 2026, Uzbekistan will present one of its most ambitious cultural projects to date at the Milan Design Week. Titled When Apricots Blossom, the exhibition will take place at Palazzo Citterio in Milan’s Brera district, transforming the historic space into a multi-layered exploration of craft, memory, and environmental change. Organized by the Uzbekistan Art and Culture Development Foundation, the exhibition is commissioned by its chairperson, Gayane Umerova, and curated by architect Kulapat Yantrasast, founder of WHY Architecture. Bringing together twelve international designers and Uzbek artisans, the project explores how traditional knowledge can help societies respond to environmental crises. At its core lies Karakalpakstan, an autonomous region in northwestern Uzbekistan that has experienced one of the world’s most severe ecological disasters. A Story Rooted in Loss and Resilience The exhibition takes its name from a poem by Hamid Olimjon, written in the 1930s as a reflection on hope and renewal. Today, that symbolism carries renewed relevance. For decades, the Aral Sea has been shrinking. Once one of the largest inland bodies of water in the world, it has lost more than 90% of its volume since the 1960s, largely due to irrigation policies that diverted its feeder rivers. The result is a transformed landscape of desert, salt plains, and fragmented ecosystems, with communities forced to adapt to rapid environmental change. [caption id="attachment_30520" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Moynaq. Aral Culture Summit 2025; image courtesy of Iwan Baan and ACDF[/caption] Rather than focusing solely on loss, When Apricots Blossom highlights how communities continue to live, create, and adapt. Visitors enter through a façade transformed by a large textile installation by British designer Bethan Laura Wood, created in collaboration with Uzbek artisans. Drawing on decorative elements used in nomadic yurts, tassels, ribbons, and woven patterns, the work creates a vivid and tactile threshold. Inside the courtyard, an installation of apricot trees by Uzbek floral artist Ruben Saakyan sets the tone. The apricot, both a symbol of hospitality and a key Uzbek export, also reflects resilience, continuing to grow even in the harsh conditions of the Aral Sea region. Further inside, a “deconstructed yurt” designed by WHY Architecture serves as a central gathering space, reflecting the adaptability of nomadic shelter traditions. Craft as Knowledge, Not Decoration For Umerova, this distinction is central. “Craft in Karakalpakstan is more than tradition, it is a system of knowledge,” she told The Times of Central Asia. “It has evolved over centuries in close relationship with the land.” [caption id="attachment_46319" align="aligncenter" width="1440"] Handwoven textiles on a traditional loom at “When Apricots Blossom”; image: ACDF[/caption]   Umerova notes that materials such as wood, silk, felt, ceramic, and reed reflect a deep understanding of local ecosystems. These practices are passed down through generations, carrying both technical skills and cultural knowledge. In the context of the Aral Sea crisis, this knowledge takes on renewed importance. “The communities there have long developed ways of adapting to changing environments,” she told TCA. “Their craft traditions embody this resilience.” For Umerova, sustainability is as much cultural as it is technological. “Sustainability is not only a technological question but also a cultural one, about memory, responsibility, and continuity.” Throughout the exhibition, objects are presented not merely as artifacts, but as expressions shaped by necessity, environment, and history. Beyond the Exhibition: A Long-Term Vision When Apricots Blossom forms part of a broader strategy aimed at supporting long-term regeneration in the Aral Sea region. Alongside the installations, the exhibition introduces initiatives such as the Aral School and the Aral Culture Summit, as well as development projects in Nukus. “Environmental recovery is essential, but cultural and educational investment is equally important,” Umerova said. The Aral School is envisioned as a platform for young designers, artists, and researchers to explore new approaches to environmental and cultural challenges. “The aim is not only to preserve traditions, but to reinterpret them,” she said. Meanwhile, the Aral Culture Summit brings together designers, architects, scientists, and policymakers to develop integrated solutions. “This transdisciplinary approach is essential. It allows us to connect culture with science, data, and policy.” The exhibition will also present an architectural model for a redevelopment project in Nukus, where an old hangar is being transformed into a community and cultural center. Bringing the Aral Sea to the World Presenting the exhibition at Milan Design Week is a deliberate choice aimed at drawing global attention to the region. “The Aral Sea is a cautionary tale,” Umerova said. “But it can also offer a blueprint.” By placing Uzbek artisans alongside international designers, the exhibition highlights both the global relevance of traditional knowledge and the environmental realities that shape it. Designing Everyday Experience Yantrasast, the founder of WHY Architecture, approached the project by focusing on the fundamentals of daily life. “The exhibition centers on shelter, sustenance, and clothing,” he said. “These are not just necessities, they are the essential arts of living.” By grounding the exhibition in familiar elements, food, textiles, and structures, the project makes complex environmental narratives more accessible. “Resilience is not abstract,” he added. “It is embedded in everyday life.” He also emphasized the importance of reframing perceptions of the region. “Many people know the Aral Sea only as an ecological disaster. But the communities there demonstrate remarkable ingenuity.” Collaboration Across Cultures A central feature of the exhibition is collaboration between international designers and Uzbek artisans. Twelve designers were invited to create bread trays and stamps; objects rooted in everyday Uzbek culture. Bread, or non, carries deep symbolic meaning, representing hospitality and continuity. [caption id="attachment_46320" align="aligncenter" width="1440"] An artisan demonstrates embroidery techniques; image: ACDF[/caption] Dutch designer Sanne Visser described the process as one of constant exchange. “It’s a dialogue,” she said. “The materials guide the design, but so does the artisan’s expertise.” Environmental realities also shaped the work. “There are limited resources and a rapidly changing climate,” she noted. “This affects how crafts are practiced.” For example, traditional materials used in yurt-making are becoming less available, prompting artisans to adapt with alternatives. “These changes show how traditions evolve,” Visser said. Rethinking Karakalpakstan Uzbek architect Bobir Klichev said the project challenged common perceptions of Karakalpakstan. “It is often seen as a desert with a vanished sea,” he said. Closer engagement revealed a more complex landscape, including canals, agricultural areas, and ecological diversity. “This diversity became central to my work,” Klichev said. A Different Way of Looking At Palazzo Citterio, the exhibition is designed to encourage close attention to materials and textures. In the main gallery, an installation of reed-like structures evokes the Aral Sea landscape. A specially commissioned film, Where The Water Ends, explores how communities preserve memory amid environmental change. Together, these elements create a narrative that moves between past, present, and future. More Than an Exhibition Ultimately, When Apricots Blossom is not only about design, but about how people respond to change. It suggests that solutions to global challenges may lie not only in new technologies, but also in knowledge embedded in everyday practices. By bringing these stories to Milan, Uzbekistan is not only presenting its culture; it is also inviting a broader reconsideration of how resilience and knowledge are understood. As Umerova put it, the goal is to connect past and future through practice, demonstrating that even in the face of loss, creativity continues to endure.

Fuel prices

Central Asia Avoids Fuel Shock as Global Pressures Build

Central Asia has so far avoided the immediate fuel shocks spreading across much of the world following the U.S. and Israel’s war with Iran. There are no lines at gas stations, no visible shortages, and no signs of panic buying. But that stability sits within a rapidly tightening global market, where disruptions in Asia and policy responses in Europe are reshaping fuel flows in ways the region will struggle to avoid.

Across Southeast Asia, governments are already taking precautionary steps. Some state agencies and private firms are shifting parts of their workforce to remote work to reduce fuel consumption and prepare for potential price spikes and logistics disruptions, while Thailand is preparing contingency measures, including possible fuel rationing.

China, one of Asia’s largest suppliers of refined fuels, has moved to restrict exports of gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel in an effort to prevent domestic shortages linked to the war. The move is expected to tighten supplies across Asia, especially for countries that rely on Chinese fuel imports. China supplied about one-third of Australia’s jet fuel last year, highlighting the wider regional impact, and roughly half of the Philippines’ and Bangladesh’s in 2024. Vietnam has already warned airlines to prepare for flight reductions in April due to the risk of shortages caused by these export restrictions. Indonesia is also imposing limits on fuel sales.  Fuel-related pressures have begun to emerge in Europe as well. Poland has introduced tax measures aimed at reducing fuel prices, with the government saying this will lower prices for consumers. Slovenia, meanwhile, has introduced significant restrictions on fuel consumption. Under new rules, private motorists are limited to purchasing a maximum of 50 liters per day, while businesses and farmers may purchase up to 200 liters daily. The combined effect of war-driven energy shocks and renewed tariff barriers is raising global costs and adding pressure across trade, transport, and inflation. Against this backdrop, Central Asia’s apparent stability is misleading. It is highly unlikely that import-dependent states such as Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan will be as well protected as Kazakhstan, which may benefit in the short term from higher crude prices. Starting April 1, Russia is banning gasoline exports in an effort to stabilize its own domestic market. Russia is a key fuel supplier to Central Asia. However, according to assurances from the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, the temporary export ban will not affect supplies to Uzbekistan. Deliveries under intergovernmental agreements are expected to continue, ensuring that at least part of the region’s supply remains uninterrupted. In Kyrgyzstan, despite recent developments, fuel prices and supplies remain relatively stable. The government is considering lowering taxes or temporarily waiving excise duties for fuel importers should the crisis continue. Information from Turkmenistan is difficult to verify independently. Despite reports of fuel shortages at gas stations last year, official media are now indicating a significant increase in domestic gasoline production. The production plan for January-February 2026 was reportedly fulfilled at 122.7%, according to Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Guvancha Agajanov, speaking at a recent government meeting. Kazakhstan occupies a special position due to its substantial reserves of key mineral resources. Currently, there appear to be no major supply issues, even amid emerging global pressures. However, underlying challenges are becoming more apparent. As of March 23, 2026, data from GlobalPetrolPrices places Kazakhstan among the countries with some of the lowest gasoline prices. This group includes Libya, Iran, Venezuela, Angola, Kuwait, Algeria, Turkmenistan, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Oman. In these countries, fuel prices, ranging from $0.34 to $0.70 per liter, are shaped either by abundant natural resources or strong state intervention. Kazakhstan follows a similar model, combining domestic resource availability with government regulation. The country maintains a moratorium on price increases for the most in-demand fuel grades. However, according to Kazakhstani expert Olzhas Baideldinov, wholesale prices for petroleum products have risen by 17%. Rail transport costs have increased significantly (+72%), along with other expenses. As a result, gas stations are reportedly operating at a loss when selling gasoline and diesel. This suggests that Kazakhstan’s domestic fuel market requires substantial adjustment. For comparison, gasoline prices (per liter), according to GlobalPetrolPrices, currently stand at: U.S. - $1.133; Azerbaijan - $0.676; Kazakhstan - $0.507; Kyrgyzstan - $0.917; Turkmenistan - $0.428; and Uzbekistan - $1.077. Tajikistan stands apart, with gasoline prices above $1.10 per liter, the highest in Central Asia, reflecting its heavy dependence on imported fuel. These figures reflect a mix of domestic resources and state controls that continue to shield local markets from global price pressures. The region's exposure is not immediate, but it is structural.

Central Asia’s energy security is not just about supply, but also about routes. The region remains heavily dependent on external refining systems and transport corridors that are now under pressure, whether through Russia, the Caspian, or southern routes linked to the Persian Gulf. Disruptions far beyond the region are therefore quickly transmitted into local markets.

For now, Central Asia looks insulated. But in a tightening system, insulation is often temporary.

Trade

Uzbekistan and Russia Focus on Trade and Transit at Termez Meeting

Uzbekistan and Russia used a conference in Termez on March 30–31 to highlight the breadth of their relationship, from trade and industrial projects to transport links and regional planning. The meeting was organized by Uzbekistan’s Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies and Russia’s Kremlin-linked policy forum, the Valdai Discussion Club. Participants included Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin, Uzbek Deputy Foreign Minister Bobur Usmanov, ISRS director Eldor Aripov, Russian Ambassador Alexei Yerkhov, and other Uzbek and Russian officials, analysts, and business representatives. The meeting comes at a time of shifting regional dynamics, as Central Asian states recalibrate ties with Russia while managing new economic and political pressures from multiple directions.

Termez sits by the Friendship Bridge on Uzbekistan’s border with Afghanistan and has become one of Tashkent’s main platforms for trade, logistics, and diplomacy aimed southward. The conference program focused on transport, infrastructure, interregional ties, and industrial cooperation, so the location matters. This aligns Uzbekistan’s relationship with Russia with a wider push for new routes across Eurasia and toward South Asia.

The economic backdrop is also substantial. Official Uzbek figures put bilateral trade with Russia at around $13 billion in 2025, making Russia Uzbekistan’s second-largest trading partner after China. Uzbek reporting says that trade has grown sharply since 2017, with Russian investment in Uzbekistan approaching $5 billion. Officials have described the relationship as moving beyond simple trade toward industrial cooperation, technological partnerships, and longer value chains.

The conference emphasized the growing role of direct regional links. Uzbek officials highlighted more than 200 regional initiatives worth over $4 billion and identified Tatarstan as a key partner in industry, petrochemicals, engineering, information technology, and education. Projects linked to the Himgrad industrial park model and branches of Kazan Federal University in Uzbekistan show how cooperation now extends through regions, universities, and industrial zones, not just central governments.

Energy remains a key part of the relationship. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, on March 24, Uzbekistan and Russia advanced work on Uzbekistan’s planned nuclear power project in the Jizzakh region. Uzbekistan’s nuclear agency, Uzatom, and Russia’s Rosatom signed new documents and began initial concrete works for a small-capacity unit, describing the step as moving the project into a new implementation phase.

Transit formed another major part of the agenda. Uzbek reporting states that participants discussed modernizing northern routes and developing a southern route through Afghanistan toward ports on the Indian Ocean. This fits Uzbekistan’s longer effort to turn Termez into a logistics hub for Afghan and South Asian trade. The city hosts the Termez International Trade Center, designed to simplify border trade and business access.

The timing also reflects wider regional pressures. TCA previously reported that the war involving Iran is placing a strain on southern routes and increasing the importance of alternative corridors. In that context, a Russia–Uzbekistan meeting focused on trade and transport in Termez underscores how both countries are linking bilateral cooperation to shifting regional logistics.

The meeting in Termez did not produce a major treaty or a single headline project. It showed instead that Uzbekistan is expanding practical cooperation with Russia across trade, industry, energy, and transport while maintaining a broader multi-vector foreign policy. It also highlighted Termez as a key node where Uzbekistan’s ties with Russia connect to its wider ambitions in Afghanistan and South Asia.

Southern Corridor

The Iran Conflict Is Stress-Testing Central Asia’s Southern Corridors

Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s proposal of Turkestan city as a venue for Iran-war negotiations shows how directly the conflict had already begun to affect Central Asia itself. The region is no longer simply observing events in Iran. By the time Tokayev made the offer, Central Asian governments were already dealing with evacuations, route disruption, emergency diplomatic coordination, and growing concern over the war’s economic effects. The Iran war has thus become a real test of Central Asia’s southern diversification strategy. Governments across the region have, in recent years, sought to widen access to world markets through Iran, the South Caucasus, and, in some cases, Afghanistan and Pakistan. These channels reduce dependence on northern routes by opening access to Türkiye, Europe, Gulf markets, and the Indian Ocean. The present crisis subjects that strategy to wartime conditions. The strain of war makes it easier to distinguish durable links, conditional ones, and routes that remain more aspirational than real. The C6 and Crisis Coordination The first effects have been practical. Turkmenistan has opened four additional checkpoints along its frontier with Iran, supplementing the Serakhs crossing, while Azerbaijan’s overland route through Astara became another critical outlet, evacuating 312 people from 17 countries between February 28 and March 2. Turkmenistan, according to official reporting, transited more than 200 foreign citizens from 16 countries during the same period. Uzbekistan used the Turkmen route to repatriate its citizens, while Kazakhstan directed its nationals toward overland exits through Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Türkiye. The war is already affecting borders, consular work, and the regional diplomatic agenda. This immediate response gives sharper political meaning to the widening of the Central Asian C5 into a C6 with Azerbaijan. The March 2 call among the five Central Asian foreign ministers and Azerbaijan showed that the format was already there to be used under pressure. What had until now appeared mainly as a corridor framework shaped by summit diplomacy and expert work appeared instead as a working format for crisis coordination linking Central Asia to the South Caucasus. The C6 idea is becoming more practical and more overtly diplomatic. The Organization of Turkic States adds a second, broader layer. Its foreign ministers met in Istanbul on March 7 and issued a joint statement expressing concern over the escalation in the Middle East, condemning actions that endanger civilians, warning against further regional destabilization, and affirming that threats to the security and interests of member states concern the organization as a whole. The statement was cautious, and the OTS is not turning into a military instrument. Even so, the war is testing whether a Turkic political space extending from Turkey through the South Caucasus to Central Asia can do more than express concern as regional security deteriorates. The C6 is becoming a working format for immediate coordination, while the OTS remains the broader political frame within which that coordination takes on institutional meaning. Corridor Stress and Resilience The trans-Iran transit option offers Central Asia a continuous land arc from regional railheads and road networks onward to Türkiye and connected European systems, with the further possibility of reaching southern ports on the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf. Under ordinary conditions, that continuity is its main advantage over routes that require repeated port and rail transfers: it reduces transshipment points, shortens the route in practice, and can make timing more predictable. Under wartime conditions, however, the same corridor is exposed to airspace closures, border disruption, sanctions complications, financing friction, insurance risk, and broader political uncertainty. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or Middle Corridor, avoids Iran-linked routes and instead depends on a more segmented chain. It relies on port capacity, scheduling, and political stability across a wider set of nodes: rail or road to Caspian shipping ports such as Aktau or Kuryk, sea passage across the Caspian, and stable conditions in the South Caucasus to keep traffic moving on time through Azerbaijan and Georgia toward Türkiye and Europe. Tehran’s March 5 drone strike on Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave, one of the most serious recent incidents in bilateral relations, showed how directly the conflict could affect the Middle Corridor. Uzbekistan complicates the picture because alternatives through Afghanistan and Pakistan toward the Arabian Sea and Gulf markets pass through it. Uzbekistan is not just a single-corridor user. It is one of the main gateways for several southward routes at once: west-southwest through Turkmenistan and Iran, south through Afghanistan toward Pakistani ports, and east-west through projects linking China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan more closely to downstream routes. None of these options can simply substitute for another, and none escapes the wider instability to the south. Current conditions cast doubt on all of them. The war is testing not just routes through Iran but the broader logic of southward diversification. Second-order Stress Transmission The same pressure is now visible in the skies. Europe-Asia flight patterns have already shifted as carriers avoid Iranian and other risky airspace. TCA reported that Central Asia’s airspace has value not as a substitute for Gulf hubs but in a narrower, more practical sense, as overflight space when southern corridors become harder to use. The European Union Aviation Safety Agency has meanwhile kept in force a conflict-zone bulletin warning operators about Iranian and neighboring airspace. Disruption in the usual geometry of Europe-Asia air traffic increases the importance of Central Asia’s skies. TCA also noted early in the crisis that a wider conflict could reverberate across Central Asia through rising energy prices and pressure on major transport corridors. Spillover from the Iran war affects not only routes that stop functioning. It also forces airlines onto longer routes with higher fuel costs, alters shipping and insurance calculations, and raises logistics costs more generally. The cost, timing, and insurability of goods movement to and through landlocked Central Asia already depend on long-distance logistics. Changes here channel the effects of a distant war into domestic economies. Turkmenistan offers the clearest early sign of how fast an Iranian supply shock can spread across Central Asia. Retailers and consumers in Ashgabat have told Reuters that prices for key goods imported from Iran have risen sharply because cross-border trade has slowed. Kyrgyzstan has also seen direct disruption of logistics, forcing importers and logistics firms to seek alternative arrangements, as freight forwarders told TCA that cargo transit through Iran had effectively stopped. These are concrete examples of how the war’s shocks are spreading through Central Asia. The broader regional question is how far such pressures extend into Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan through fuel, shipping, construction inputs, consumer goods, and supply costs more generally. Implications for the Caspian Region and Beyond The conflict’s movement toward the Caspian Sea littoral broadens the stakes. Israeli strikes on Iranian naval targets in the Caspian brought the war into a maritime zone relevant to regional energy and transit flows. The issue is no longer limited to Gulf shipping or borderland evacuation. It now reaches into a maritime-energy space central to Central Asian economic security and wider Eurasian connectivity. For Central Asia, the immediate question is where resilience must now be strengthened: in evacuation coordination, alternative routes, transport-risk management, and protection against import shocks. The deeper question concerns regional agency. The current shock exposes logistical weak points. It could strengthen corridor diversification, but only if the region finds ways to act on those weaknesses rather than merely react to them. The wider Eurasian significance extends beyond Central Asia. China has an interest in containing instability to preserve reliable westward and southward corridors. Greater instability around the Caspian is not in Moscow’s interest, even if Russia may benefit when southern alternatives weaken. The European Union has a clear stake in resilient non-Russian connectivity across the Caspian and South Caucasus, not least because many of its current assumptions about Eurasian connectivity depend on those corridors functioning with reasonable predictability. The United States, for its part, has an interest in regional stability and in preventing Central Asia’s room for maneuver from narrowing under the pressure of war. The deeper question is whether Central Asia can remain connected on terms that preserve strategic flexibility across Eurasia in a more sharply divided order.

Podcast

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team examine a series of major developments across Central Asia, from the results of Kazakhstan's constitutional referendum to the announcement of new Chinese-funded border outposts and fortifications along Tajikistan's frontier. We also look at the continuing fallout from the security shake-up in Kyrgyzstan, with further arrests and resignations, as well as the increasingly strange foreign movements of Turkmenistan's senior leadership while war continues to rage just across the border in Iran, alongside Tehran's threats to strike Turkmen infrastructure. The episode then turns to the escalating conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan, where some of the heaviest fighting in months is raising fresh questions about border stability, regional security, and the risk of wider spillover. Finally, for our main story, we bring on a panel of experts to discuss the growing issues surrounding the Rogun Dam and its resettlement project, and how both are likely to affect the states downstream. On the show this week: - Eugene Simonov (Rivers Without Boundaries Coalition) - Mark Fodor (Coalition for Human Rights in Development)

Caspian

Caspian Escalation Raises Stakes for Central Asia

Central Asia, which has increasingly sought to present itself as a coordinated actor on the global political stage, has until recently maintained a cautious, non-aligned stance regarding the escalation in the Middle East. However, attacks affecting infrastructure in the Caspian region have altered the diplomatic balance. The Caspian Sea is a critical transit zone for Central Asia, linking Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan and onward to European and Middle Eastern markets. It forms part of key east–west and north–south trade corridors that have gained importance since Russia’s war in Ukraine disrupted traditional transit routes. In recent years, regional dynamics have also been shaped by Azerbaijan’s growing engagement with Central Asian states, including its formal inclusion in the expanded Central Asian consultative format, which has effectively evolved from the C5 into the C6. Baku has played an important role in regional connectivity. It has developed close relations with both Turkey and Israel, factors that influence geopolitical calculations in the Caspian basin, which directly borders Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. This growing alignment has reinforced efforts to develop the Middle Corridor across the Caspian, linking Central Asia to Europe via the South Caucasus. Turkey maintains political, economic, and cultural influence in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan through the Organization of Turkic States. Russian political discourse has at times portrayed this cooperation as part of a broader pan-Turkic geopolitical project, a characterization widely dismissed by officials and analysts in Central Asia. Nevertheless, Astana and Baku continue to maintain strong relations with Ankara, a development that has periodically caused concern in Moscow. Under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kazakhstan has also strengthened ties with Gulf states. Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia have become significant investors in the country’s economy. In this context, Iranian attacks on Gulf states not directly involved in the conflict have shaped Astana’s diplomatic positioning during the current crisis. Reports of drone attacks widely blamed on Iran targeting the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan have further heightened regional tensions. At the initial stage of the escalation, Kazakhstan’s response was largely limited to diplomatic contacts with regional leaders. At the same time, several Central Asian countries, along with Azerbaijan, expressed concern over the humanitarian consequences of the conflict and began dispatching aid to Iran. Azerbaijan sent nearly 30 tons of food and medical supplies on March 10, followed by another 82 tons of humanitarian aid on March 18. Uzbekistan delivered approximately 120 tons of humanitarian supplies, including flour, vegetable oil, sugar, and canned food, according to regional media reports. Turkmenistan also sent humanitarian aid consisting of medicines, medical supplies, and other goods, primarily intended for children. The Tajik government reported sending a convoy of 110 heavy trucks carrying humanitarian cargo to Iran, with a total weight of 3,610 tons. The diplomatic environment shifted further after Israeli air strikes on March 18 targeting Iranian naval facilities in the Caspian Sea. According to Israeli military statements cited by international media, the targets included a major port of the Iranian Navy, where, reportedly, "dozens of ships were destroyed,” as well as “the central command post of the Iranian Navy and infrastructure used for the repair and maintenance of Iranian military vessels.” The basin is also central to regional energy flows, with offshore infrastructure, shipping routes, and pipeline-linked export systems connecting Caspian producers to global markets. Any expansion of conflict into this space raises risks for both energy exports and maritime transport. Security in the Caspian basin is a shared concern for both littoral states and their regional partners. According to analyst Denis Borisov, Iran’s Caspian transport infrastructure forms part of regional corridors used by Central Asian states, making stability in the basin strategically important. Kazakhstan, one of the five Caspian littoral states, began actively signaling support for de-escalation shortly after the strikes. On March 21, speaking in the Turkestan region, President Tokayev called for an end to attacks on civilian and economic targets and urged parties to engage in negotiations. He reiterated Kazakhstan’s readiness to host potential peace talks. On March 22, the presidents of Kazakhstan and Iran exchanged congratulatory messages on the occasion of Eid al-Fitr and Nauryz. Tokayev expressed hopes for strengthened unity and stability in the Middle East. Diplomatic contacts intensified on March 23, when Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov held a telephone conversation with his Iranian counterpart Seyed Abbas Araghchi to discuss regional developments and possible steps toward reducing military tensions, including the need to maintain security in the Caspian region. On the same day, Turkmenistan’s Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov also spoke with Araghchi. Iranian readouts of the call warned that recent strikes could have security and environmental consequences for the Caspian Sea. Also on March 23, Tokayev received the United Arab Emirates Ambassador to Kazakhstan, Mohammed Said Mohammed al-Ariqi. During the meeting, Tokayev expressed concern over Iranian bombardments targeting the UAE, reiterated Kazakhstan’s opposition to involving neutral states in the conflict, and once again offered Kazakhstan as a platform for peace talks. The escalation affecting the Caspian region has therefore acted as a catalyst for intensified diplomatic engagement by Central Asian states and Azerbaijan aimed at steering the crisis toward dialogue. As Tokayev has suggested, such efforts may prove critical before the window for negotiated solutions narrows. As the conflict edges closer to key transit and energy routes, the stakes for Central Asia are no longer peripheral, but immediate.

Nauryz

The History of Nauryz: An Ancient Festival That Continues to Unite Central Asia

Ahead of the Nauryz holiday, The Times of Central Asia looks at the origins and enduring significance of one of the region’s oldest celebrations. More than a seasonal festival, Nauryz reflects a deep connection between people, nature, and cultural identity, a tradition that has evolved over thousands of years and remains central to life across Central Asia. Origins and Meaning

Nauryz, also known as Nowruz, is one of the world’s oldest holidays, marking the arrival of spring and the beginning of a new year. It is celebrated on the day of the spring equinox, when day and night are approximately equal and nature appears to begin a new cycle.

For many communities, the holiday symbolizes renewal, hope for prosperity, and the start of a new stage in life.

The name “Nowruz” derives from ancient Iranian words meaning “new day.” This concept lies at the heart of the celebration: the renewal of life and the symbolic rebirth of nature after winter.

With a history spanning more than 3,000 years, the holiday spread across Eurasia along the Silk Roads and became embedded in the cultural traditions of Central Asia, the Middle East, and the Caucasus. [caption id="attachment_45687" align="alignnone" width="300"] @depositphotos[/caption] Today, Nowruz is recognized not only as a calendar event but also as a cultural tradition that promotes values such as peace, mutual respect, and harmony with nature. Connection to the Spring Equinox Nauryz is traditionally celebrated during the spring equinox, which usually falls on March 20 or 21, when the Sun crosses the celestial equator and daylight and nighttime hours are nearly equal. Since ancient times, this moment has symbolized the awakening of nature and the beginning of a new agricultural year. Historical sources indicate that different communities once observed various dates in March, often guided by natural signs. Over time, however, the astronomical equinox, commonly observed on March 21, became the most widely accepted date. Medieval scholars paid close attention to this phenomenon. In the 11th and 12th centuries, astronomers such as Omar Khayyam refined calendar calculations to align the start of the year more precisely with the equinox. Alongside scientific knowledge, traditional methods were also used to forecast harvests and weather conditions, including observing seed germination or measuring the length of shadows before the holiday. Today, Nauryz is officially celebrated on March 21 in countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, while UNESCO also recognizes Nowruz as marking the first day of spring. Rituals and Traditions For centuries, Nauryz has been marked by rituals symbolizing renewal, fertility, and prosperity. Among both nomadic and settled communities, it has traditionally been celebrated with public festivities, games, and family gatherings. Common customs include ritual cleansing with water, exchanging gifts, and offering food to neighbors and guests. The altybakan swing is widely regarded as a symbol of spring and joy. In some regions, the ancient practice of jumping over fire has been preserved as a purification ritual. Food plays a central role in the celebration. Although culinary traditions vary by country, they share a common symbolism of abundance and new life. In Kazakhstan, the main festive dish is Nauryz kozhe, a soup prepared from seven ingredients representing prosperity and well-being. In Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, sumalak, a sweet dish made from sprouted wheat, is a key symbol of the holiday. Sumalak is traditionally prepared collectively, often overnight, with participants taking turns stirring the pot and making wishes. It is believed to bring prosperity and fertility. Festive tables also feature dishes such as plov, herb-filled samsa, and manty dumplings. Celebrations are typically accompanied by traditional games and competitions, including horse racing, wrestling, equestrian contests, and street performances. People gather around a shared dastarkhan, sing songs, visit relatives, and exchange wishes for health, peace, and prosperity. [caption id="attachment_45688" align="alignnone" width="300"] @depositphotos[/caption] From Suppression to Revival During the Soviet period, large-scale public celebrations of Nauryz were restricted, and many traditions were preserved mainly within families and local communities. From the late 1980s onward, however, the holiday began to experience a revival. Following the independence of Central Asian states, Nauryz was officially recognized as a public holiday across the region. Today, it is widely celebrated in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, with festivals, fairs, and public events held in major cities. Its international recognition underscores its cultural significance. In 2009, Nowruz was inscribed on UNESCO’s Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity, and since 2010 March 21 has been observed as the International Day of Nowruz.

Nauryz remains one of the most enduring cultural traditions in Central Asia, with its meaning preserved across generations.

Its emphasis on renewal and hospitality continues to bring communities together across borders and remains a familiar part of life across the region.

Middle East Crisis

Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan Send Humanitarian Aid to Iran

Tajikistan is sending a convoy of 110 trucks carrying humanitarian aid to Iran, which has been targeted by heavy U.S. and Israeli air strikes in a war that started on February 28. The dispatch of aid follows similar deliveries by Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan.  Central Asian countries are aiming for neutrality in the Mideast war, maintaining ties with the Iranian government even as they profess support for Gulf Arab states that have been targeted by Iranian drones and missiles. Iran’s relationships with countries to the east range from the close cultural affinity that it enjoys with Tajikistan to sometimes tense interactions with Azerbaijan, which has a military partnership with Israel.   The trucks from Tajikistan left for Iran on Wednesday and “will soon arrive in the friendly and brotherly country,” Tajikistan’s government said, without providing details about how the aid will be distributed. The convoy would likely travel through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to reach the northeastern Iranian border. The aid “comprises 3,610 tons of cargo, including 45 tons of medicines, a large volume of sanitary and hygienic products, children's clothing, various food products, household items, bedding, tents, building materials, and other necessary supplies,” Tajikistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said.   Tajik President Emomali Rahmon posted a photo on social media that showed a long line of aid trucks on a highway.  Turkmenistan, which shares a border with Iran, has said it sent humanitarian aid, mainly for distribution to children. It appeared to allude to the war, saying that “supporting and assisting close neighbors in difficult times is a noble tradition of the Turkmen people, rooted in ancient times.” Uzbekistan has sent trucks carrying flour, rice, sugar, pasta, sunflower oil, canned goods and medical supplies to Iran.   Azerbaijan, which borders northwest Iran, has also dispatched truckloads of humanitarian aid to Iran, according to Ali Alizada, Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Iran. Azerbaijan previously said it was evacuating staff from its embassy in Tehran as well as its consulate in the Iranian city of Tabriz, after accusing Iran of drone attacks on its territory.